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Privatization promises that it will promote economic efficiencies through competition, 
improve productivity, business and investment opportunities, and falling unemployment. The 
growing appeal of privatization, can be traced back to the economic developments in the mid 
1970s. At that time, it became apparent that privatization was a major contributor not only 
to economic growth, but also to social and political stability. 
When a nation's output grows faster than its population, its standard of living rises. 
Output growth depends on the availability and quality of input, and how efficiently those 
inputs are combined to produce output. Output growth also depends on scientific and 
engineering advances that make it possible to produce more output from a given amount of 
inputs. There are two basic contributors involved with economic growth, public enterprises 
and private enterprises. Also involved is government policy, with a synergistic relationship 
that results in an economy's overall development and performance. 
Indonesian philosophy of economic development has been based on the principle of 
collective cooperation. Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, states that important production 
sectors which affect the lives of most people and the exploration of land, water, and natural 
resources should be controlled by the state. Public Enterprises (PEs) initially established by 
the Dutch, were after independence taken over by the Indonesian government. In addition, 
the Indonesian government has also established many PEs in various sectors of the economy. 
Through the years, the dominance of PEs in the Indonesian economy has been increasing. 
In 1976, PEs in Indonesia reached 153 excluding the state banks. These enterprises can 
be classified into several categories. With this composition PEs and private enterprises, 
Indonesia has achieved an average growth of almost 7% per annum for the last twenty years. 
Although Indonesia's per capita income reached US $ 665 in 1993, Indonesia still is 
classified as a low income country. In 1991, the PEs sector in Indonesia consists of more 
than 180 enterprises, excluding subsidiaries of PEs and other enterprises owned by local 
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government. This represents an estimated 15% of GDP, with an employment of 1.15 million 
or 1. 7% of the labor force. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Geography 
The Republic oflndonesia, the world's largest island nation, lies on both sides of the 
Equator between south-eastern tip of the Asian mainland and Australia. It extends more than 
5,120 km from east to west and 2,000 km from north to south. However, nearly four-fifths 
of the area consists of sea. The country consists of more than 17,000 islands that are 
extremely varied size and character, of which some 6,000 are inhabited. 
Sumatra is the largest island, though its area is exceeded by the Indonesian segment, 
about two-thirds, of Borneo, Kalimantan. These islands are followed in size by Irian Jaya, 
then by Sulawesi, and by Java. The remaining areas are much smaller islands, comprising 
Bali, the Nusa Tenggara group and small scattering islands ofMaluku, which lie between 
Sulawesi and Irian Jaya. 
Difference in size reflect fundamental differences in geological structure. All the large 
islands except Sulawesi stand on one or the other two great continental shelves: Sunda shelf 
representing a prolongation of the Asian mainland, and Sahul shelf, which is covered by the 
shallow Arafuru Sea and links New Guinea with Australia. 
Indonesia previously was known as the Dutch East Indies. It was renowned through 
history for its production of spices. After centuries of Dutch colonial dominance and three 
years Japanese occupation during World War II, a republic was proclaimed on August 17, · 
1945. But not until December 1948, did the Dutch formally surrender their sovereignty to 
an independent Indonesian state. 
2. The People 
Some 300 ethnic groups, speaking more than 200 languages or dialects live in the 
archipelago. With an estimated population of 190 million in 1993, Indonesia ranks as the 
fourth populous country in the world, after the People's Republic of China, India, and the 
United States. Even though Indonesia's population growth rate had decreased over the 
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decades, the population continued to grow. With an annual growth rate estimated at 1.7%, 
the population is expected to double by 2025 (Frederick 1993, p.83). The Indonesian 
characteristic of seeking consensus through discussion, promotes national unity as well as 
cohesion within comm~al groups. 
Indonesian's large population is very unevenly distributed. About 62% of the people 
are crowded onto the islands of Java, Bali, and Madura, which make up 7% of the country's 
total land area. Some parts of Java have very high rural population densities, with 5,000 or 
more people per square kilometer. In contrast is Sumatra which has 25% of nation's total area 
and only 19% of the total population Kalimantan with 28% of the national territory has only 
4.5% of the population. 
Nearly 90% of the Indonesian population is Muslim, one of the largest Muslim 
population of the world. About 6% of the people are Christians and 2% adhere to Hindu, 
principally in Bali. The remainder are Buddhist, Confucian, or other teachings. Religion in 
Indonesia is a complex and volatile issue. The state guaranteed tolerance for certain religions 
regarded as monotheistic by the government, including Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and 
Buddhism, but only as long as these religions remained outside of politics. 
3. Economy 
Indonesia's economy is predominantly agricultural, although agriculture's share of 
gross national product and employment has declined. Export production is important in this 
sector and is strongly influenced by world market condition. Throughout the 1970s, tax 
revenues earned from oil helped fund a growing government investment. In the mid-1980s, 
these revenues declined dramatically because of the glut of oil on the world market. 
When tax revenues were growing rapidly, the government p\rrsued ambitious 
investments in heavy industries such as steel and advanced technologies such as aeronautics. 
Petroleum exports and the increasing exploitation of other natural resources funded imports 
of machinery and raw materials vital to this rapid industrialization. Timber from Indonesia's 
vast rain forest, copper and nickel from remote mining sites, and traditional agricultural 
products such as rubber and coffee also contributed to the buoyant export earnings. 
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Agricultural programs brought the benefits of modem agricultural technology to 
millions of peasant farmers. In the 1980s new programs extended the benefits of modem 
agricultural techniques to other food and cash crops. This revolution created challenges as 
the greater diversity of crops, other than rice, and more varied conditions of cultivation made 
the task of increasing agricultural output more complex. 
Economic ideology was a departure from the former regime's brand of socialism. The 
government gained complete control over most private markets, including foreign trade and 
bank credit. Large budget deficits and intrusive economic controls led to a mounting inflation 
and a stagnant economy. Learning from the mistakes of predecessor, the hallmark of the new 
government was fiscal and monetary conservatism. Budgets were balanced, and growth in 
the money supply was restricted to contain inflation. 
The government itself assumed the role of industrialist by direct state investment, 
increasing regulations and offering special protection for favored industries. In spite of 
abundant and cheap labor, Indonesia's exports were still dominated by natural resources and 
agricultural products. The collapse of the oil market in the mid-1980s underscored the 
economy's weakness and forced the government to take stock of its economic policies. 
From the mid-1980s to the early 1990s, a wave of reforms to promote manufactured 
exports significantly reduced the role of government. Private businesses seemed prepared to 
take up the slack. Growing manufactured exports rebounded gross domestic product. The 
gross domestic product had dropped in 1982. But still many major state-owned firms, labeled 
strategic industries, are protected from any threat of privatization. 
Although available evidence on income distribution suggested that income inequality 
is declining, the extreme wealth ofthe privileged few remained a symbol of inequity and a 
sensitive public issue in the early 1990s. The vast majority of the population still lived in 
rural areas and earned a living from agriculture or from the informal sector of petty trade and 
other low-skilled services. 
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A precipitous drop in growth by the early 1980s, pointed to limits of the 
industrialization strategy. A new generation of reformers advocated a more limited role for 
the government. In the politics of economic re~orm, two main forces of influence within the 
government battled to shape economic policy. The technocrats who favored market reforms 
and a limited role for the government in the economy and the economic nationalists who 
argued that trade protection and direct government investment and regulation are necessary 
to contain foreign influence while sufficient resources are mobilized to modernize the 
economy. 
4. Government 
Indonesia is a constitutional republic. The constitution was promulgated on August 17, 
1945 at the time of Indonesia's proclamation of independence. It provides for a unitary state 
and centralized form of government. The national Indonesia legislature consists of a single 
chamber, the House of People's Representatives or Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (DPR). 
Indonesia also has a People Consultative Assembly or Dewan Permusyawaratan Rakyat 
(MPR). MPR ordinarily convenes once every five years, and in addition to electing the 
president and vice president of the republic, it also approves the general policy principle and 
direction of the government. 
According to the constitution, there are six organs of state. Sovereignty in Indonesia 
is vested in the people, who exercise their will through the MPR. Full executive authority is 
vested in the president, who is elected by and responsible to MPR. Legislative power is 
shared with the DPR. The president is advised by the Supreme Advisory Council or Dewan 
Pertimbangan Agung (DPA), whereas the State Audit Board or Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan 
(BPK) exercises financial oversight. At the apex of the judicial system is the Supreme Court 
or Kejaksaan Agung (Jagung). 
After 1965 and the destruction of the Indonesian Communist Party, the military 
dominated Indonesian politics. The policy priority of the government was economic 
development based on security, stability, and consensus. These policies brought Indonesia 
to a unitary state with a highly centralized governmental administration. This centralization 
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was seen by Indonesia's leaders as necessary in the fragmented geographical and highly 
plural ethnic setting with a history of regional and ethnic rebellion. 
The political party system was simplified with the institution of Golongan Karya, or 
Golkar, the de facto government party organized around functional groups in society. Golkar 
compete in elections with the United Development Party (PPP) and the Indonesian 
Democratic Party (PDI). Because ofthe built-in advantage of massive government support 
and highly restrictive campaign rules, Golkar had emerged victorious in all national elections 
since 1971. The freedom of action that the government enjoyed also was enhanced by a 
judicial system in which the rule of law often seemed bent to the will of government. 
C. OBJECT OF THIS RESEARCH 
The research questions are: 
• How can Indonesia maintain or increa~e her economic growth toward, and keep 
pace with international economic trends in the future? 
• What is the nature and role of privatization? 
• Why is the public sector too weak to meet future economic challenges, and on the 
other hand is the private sector of Indonesia up to the challenges of a global 
economy? 
• How will privatization contribute to the solution of Indonesia's economic 
problems and accelerate economic growth in a competitive and global world 
economy? 
Based on the privatization promises, this thesis will use an analytical study 
methodology to examine; privatization theory, public enterprise, and private enterprise in 
order to answer the research questions. In addition, by utilizing analytical methodology, this 
thesis will examine Indonesian economic performance by comparing public and private 
sector contributions to economic growth. In particular, the study will examine the manner 
in which further privatization may contribute to growth and expansion of Indonesian 
economy. Through utilizing a taxonomy of privatization strategies, the study will evaluate . 
what kinds of PEs can be most effectively privatized and what kind of PEs should be left to 
the government. 
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D. ORGANIZATIONS OF THIS STUDY 
This chapter has presented an overview of the Indonesian economy and outlines the 
purpose of the study. Chapter II presents a brief introduction to privatization theory so that 
the reader and the author have a common terminology for the remainder of the study. 
Chapter III examines the economic performance of the Indonesian economy in both the 
public and private sector. Chapter IV is an analysis and evaluation of the implementation of 
Indonesia's privatization policies with a brief survey of international experiences in 
implementing privatization. Chapter IV also includes a survey of future directions of 




II. PRIVATIZATION THEORY 
A. CHARACTERISTIC OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
Human beings require many different kinds of goods and services. Goods can be 
defined as something that has economic utility or satisfies economic wants; services can be 
defined as performance or cond"Qct that assists or benefits someone or something and usually 
does not produce a tangible commodity. Goods and services can be classified according to 
two concepts: exclusion and consumption. 
1. Exclusion 
Goods and services have the characteristic of exclusion if the potential user of the 
goods can be denied the goods or excluded from their use unless he meets the conditions set 
by the potential supplier. The goods can change hands only if both the buyer and seller agree 
on the terms. Goods and services that we buy in the marketplace clearly fall into this 
category. All have this exclusion property. 
But, there is a large number of other goods and services that do not possess this simple 
property. For example, a lighthouse is a valuable service for seafarer, but they do not pay 
the lighthouse keeper for it. The water of a large freshwater lake is another example of goods 
whose consumption cannot conveniently be prevented or excluded. 
It should be recognized that exclusion is a matter of cost. Exclusion is feasible or 
unfeasible to the extent that the cost of enforcing exclusion is relatively low or high. 
Exclusion admits to degrees of exclusion. Exclusion from the services of a lighthouse is 
rather infeasible. On the other hand exclusion in the purchase of goods from a store is 
feasible. But, other goods cannot be classified quite so neatly. 
2. Consumption 
Another important characteristic of goods and services that is relevant to this study has 
to do with consumption. Some goods may be used or consumed jointly and simultaneously 
by customers without being diminished in quality or quantity, while other goods are 
available only for individual consumption. If goods are used by one consumer, they are not 
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available for consumption by another consumer. A fish and haircut are examples of a 
commodity and a service subject to individual consumption. 
Contrast a fish or a haircut with a television broadcast, the program remains equally 
available for joint consumption by many users and is in no way diminished or made less 
useful by our act of consumption. Another illustration of joint-consumption are parks and 
streets. In fact, few goods are pure joint-consumption goods. Most fall along a continuum 
between pure individual and pure joint consumption. 
3. Classifying Goods and Services 
The two properties, exclusion and consumption, constitute the two dimensions in 
Figure 1. The four comers of the diagram correspond to pure forms: first, pure individually 
consumed goods for which exclusion is completely feasible. Second, pure jointly consumed 
goods for which exclusion is completely feasible. Third, pure individually consumed goods 
for which exclusion is completely in feasible. Fourth, pure jointly consumed goods for 
which exclusion is completely infeasible. These four idealized types of goods and services 
are called private goods, toll goods, common- pool goods, and collective goods respectively. 
The reason for classifying goods in this manner is that the nature of the goods 
determines whether or not it will be produced at all, and also the conditions needed to assure 
that it will be supplied. Private goods are consumed individually and cannot be obtained by 
the user without the assent of the supplier. Private goods are usually obtained by making 
payment. Common-pool goods are consumed individually, and it is virtually impossible to 
prevent anyone from taking them freely. 
Toll goods are used jointly, but the users must pay, and those who won't pay can easily 
be excluded from enjoying the use of the goods. The more difficult or costly it is to exclude 
a consumer from the use of toll goods, the more likely that it is a collective commodity. 
Collective goods consumed jointly, and it is impossible to exclude anyone from their use, 
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The goods that appear near the comers can be considered private goods, toll goods, 
common-pool goods, although none of them are pure or ideal types. In the upper left of the 
diagram appear the ordinary goods and services that are in the marketplace. They are all 
pure or nearly pure private goods. In the lower right are collective goods. Air pollution 
control is a pure form of collective goods. 
Air is a common-pool good. It can be used and taken freely, but upon compression it 
is changed into purely private goods. Telephone service is a toll good whose quality is 
actually enhanced when other users consume it jointly. Electric power is a toll commodity. 
Mass transit is a toll commodity, taxi service is more of a private commodity, and a private 
automobile is a more purely private commodity. 
It is clear that the nature of the goods determines the willingness of consumers to pay 
for it, and therefore, inevitably, the willingness of producers to supply it. Hence the nature 
of the goods determines whether or not collective intervention is needed to procure the goods 
in satisfactory quantity and quality. 
a. Private Goods 
Private goods pose no conceptual problem of supply. This is because the 
marketplace provides them. Consumers demand the goods, entrepreneurs recognize the 
demand and produce the goods. They sell the goods to willing buyers at mutually 
satisfactory prices. Collective action with respect to private goods is confined to assuring 
their safety, for example for food, drug etc. and honest reporting such as weights and 
measures. Even though the market can insure the supply of private goods, sometimes 
governments supply them. 
b. Common-Pool Goods 
Common-pool goods do pose a supply problem. With no need to pay for such 
goods, and with no means to prevent their consumption, goods will be consumed to the point 
of exhaustion. This will occur as long as the cost of collecting or harvesting of the free 
goods does not exceed the value of the goods to the consumer. No rational supplier will 
produce such goods, and they would exist only through the beneficence of nature. Market 
mechanisms cannot supply common-pool goods. The problem inherent in common-pool 
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goods is the danger of depletion. One way to conserve the natural supply is through 
collective action. 
c. Toll Goods 
Toll goods can be supplied by the marketplace. Because exclusion is readily 
possible, users will pay and therefore suppliers will supply the goods. Some toll goods 
present problems that require collective action. As the number of users increases, the cost 
per user decreases. The result is that it is most economical to have a single supplier. Toll 
goods are said to be natural monopolies. In any event, toll goods, like private goods, can be 
supplied in the marketplace, but in many countries toll goods are supplied by government. 
d. Collective Goods 
Collective goods pose a serious problem in the organization of a society. The 
marketplace is unable to supply such goods because, by their nature, they are used 
simultaneously by many people and no one can be excluded from enjoying them. Every 
individual has an economic incentive to make full use of such goods without paying for them 
and without contributing a fair share of the effort required to supply them. Therefore, 
collective contributions have to be obtained in order to assure a supply of the goods. 
B. ARRANGEMENT FOR PROVIDING GOODS AND SERVICES 
There are three basic participants in the delivery of a service: the service consumer, the 
service producer, and the service arranger or provider. The consumer directly obtains or 
receives the service. The consumer might be an individual, a household, everyone residing 
in a defined geographic area. 
The service producer is the agent that actually and directly performs the work or 
delivers the service to the consumer. A producer can be a unit of government, a voluntary 
association, a private firm, a nonprofit agency, or consumer himself. Moreover, the service 
arranger is the agent who assigns the producer to the consumer, or vice versa, or selects the 
producer who will serve the consumer. Frequently, but not always, the arranger is a 
government unit. 
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The relationship of the three service participants is illustrated in Figure 2. The 
consumer, the producer, and the arranger are connected by certain flows of authorization, of 
service delivery, and of payment. When a city government hires a paving contractor to 
resurface a street with asphalt, the city is the arranger, the firm is the producer, and the 
people who use the street are the consumers of these particular collective goods. 
With respect to collective goods, the arranger has significant responsibilities. The 
distinction between providing or arranging a service and producing it is profound. With 
respect to many collective goods, government is essentially an arranger or provider-an 
instrument of society for deciding what shall be done collectively, for whom, to what degree 
or at what level of supply, and how to pay for it. A government that decides that a service 
is to be provided at collective expense does not have to produce it using government 
equipment and government employees. 
These different arrangements arise because government or the private sector can serve 
as arranger or producer. This leads to four classes of arrangements: 
• Government arranges and produces a service: A government service or 
inter-governmental agreement. 
• Government arranges, the private sector produces a service: A contract, franchise, 
or grant. 
• The private sector arranges and produces a service: A voucher, market, voluntary, 
or self help. 
• The private sector arranges and the government produces a service: government 
vending. 
1. Government Service 
The term government service denotes the delivery of a service by a government agency 
using its own employees. Government acts as both the service arranger and the service 
producer. These activities are carried out by state-owned and state-run enterprises rather than 
by government bureaus, but they all come under the heading of government service. 
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Figure 2. Relationship of the Three Service Participants 
2. Government Vending 
Someone may arrange to purchase goods and services from a government agency. 
They can buy rights from government for water, minerals, or timber. In essence, government 
is competing with private firms to perform work. A private individual or organizations, the 
arranger, and government is the producer. This arrangement is called government vending. 
In this case, the consumer is the arranger. 
3. Intergovernmental Agreement 
A government can hire or pay another government to supply a service. Counties 
sometimes contract with cities and pay the latter to maintain county roads within city limits. 
States contract with cities and counties to provide social services to families and individuals. 
Reassignment of service responsibilities between jurisdictions occurring to a significant 
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degree in an attempt to handle regional problems better and cope with rising cost. We refer 
to such institutional arrangements as intergovernmental agreements. One government is the 
producer, but another is the service arranger. 
4. Contracts 
Governments contract not only with other governments but also with private firms and 
nonprofit organizations for delivery of goods and services. In this arrangement the private 
organization is the producer and government is the arranger, which pays the producer. In a 
contract arrangement, government ideally is an articulator of democratically .expressed 
demands for public goods and services, a skillful purchasing agent, and a sophisticated 
inspector of the goods and services that it purchases from the private sector. 
5. Franchises 
Franchising is another institutional structure used for providing services. An exclusive 
franchise is an award of monopoly privileges to a private firm to supply a particular service, 
usually with price regulation by a government agency. In franchise service, as in contract 
service, government is the arranger and a private organization is the producer of the service. 
However, the two can be distinguished by the means of payment to the producer. 
Government pays the producer for contract services, but the consumer pays the producer for 
franchise service. The franchise arrangement is particularly suitable for providing toll goods. 
6. Grants 
Toll goods and private goods whose consumption is to be encouraged can be 
subsidized and provided through two different structural arrangements: grants and vouchers. 
The grant may be in the form of money, tax exemption or other tax benefits, low-cost loans, 
or loan guarantees. The effect of such grants is to reduce the price of the particular goods for 
eligible consumers, who can then go into the marketplace and purchase for themselves from 
the subsidized producers more than they might otherwise consume. Under the grant 
arrangement the producer is a private firm, both the government and the consumer are 




The voucher system is also designed to encourage the consumption of particular goods 
by a particular class of consumers. Unlike the grant system, which subsidized the producer 
and restricts the consumer's choice to the subsidized producers only, the voucher system 
subsidizes the consumer and permits the latter to exercise relatively free choice in the 
marketplace. The voucher has a certain monetary value. So, the producer takes the voucher, 
turns it into the specified government agency, and receives money for it. In voucher systems, 
the producer is a private firm, both government and consumer pay the producer. Whereas 
in the grant arrangement both government and the consumer select the producer, in the 
voucher arrangement the consumer alone makes the choice. 
8. Market 
The market system is the most common of all service arrangements. It is used to 
provide most private and toll goods. The cons].ll11er arranges for service and selects the 
producer, which is a private firm. Government is not involved in the transaction in any 
significant way, although it may establish service standards. Market arrangements are widely 
used to supply such necessary goods and services. 
9. Voluntary Service 
Charitable organizations, through their voluntary efforts, provide a host of human 
services to people. Other voluntary associations perform community services that are 
provided elsewhere by government agencies. For example, recreation programs, street 
cleaning protective patrol, and fire protection by neighborhood associations. In this 
arrangement, the voluntary mutual-aid association acts as service arranger and either 
produces the service directly, using its members or employees, or hires and pays a private 
firm to do the work. 
10. Self-service 
The most basic delivery mode of all is self-help or self-service. Protection against fire 
and theft is obtained primarily by rudimentary self-service measures, such as extinguishing 
cigarettes and locking doors. The individual who brings his newspapers to recycling center, 
drives to work, or gives vocational guidance to his child is practicing self-service. The family 
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as a self-service unit is the original and most efficient. It provides a wide range of vital 
services to its members. 
11. Arrangement of Goods and Services 
The ten organizational arrangements can be thought of as pure structures that can be 
employed either alone or in combination to provide a service. It is possible to make effective 
use in service delivery of multiple, hybrid, and partial arrangements. Multiple arrangements 
can be employed by a jurisdiction for a single service. In addition to multiple arrangements, 
the use for more than one arrangement to provide the same service in the same area, there 
are hybrid arrangements. 
Partial arrangements are also widely employed. Services are usually comprised of a 
bundle of separate but coordinated activities, each of which could be supplied separately. 
Different arrangements could be used for different parts of the service. The result is a 
comprehensive service that may be part governmental, part contract, part voucher, and part 
self-service. The partitioning of the service can be carried out along either operational or 
functional lines. 
Operational activities can be separated and handled by private contractors, even though 
the basic service is performed mostly by a public agency. This is a combination of 
arrangements to provide the overall service. Along functional lines, a government agency 
can own the capital facilities required for a service but contract out the service itself. 
Conversely, an agency can produce the service but rent privately owned buildings for its 
needs. Another approach is to contract only the management of an otherwise governmental 
service. 
Moreover, there are three functional areas: ownership, management, and operations. 
These can be divided between the public and private sectors in eight different ways. By 
considering all the different elements of a typically complex public service, one may arrive 
at innovative ways to utilize the different arrangements for different parts of the service. The 
end result is a larger number of potential services producers and the creation of a competitive 
climate, a market for public services, that can lead to improved service performance. 
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C. THE FIRM AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 
In a capitalistic society, resources are owned and allocated by such nongovernmental 
organizations as firms, households, and markets. Resources owners increase productivity 
through cooperative specialization and this leads to the demand for economic organizations 
which facilitate cooperation. When a lumber mill employs a cabinetmaker, cooperation 
between specialist is achieved within a firm. When a cabinetmaker purchases wood from a 
lumberman, the cooperation takes place across markets or between firms. 
1. Economic Organization 
An important problem appears in economic organizations. Whether the gains from 
specialization and cooperative production can better be obtained within an organization or 
across markets and the structure of the organization (Alchian and Demsetz 1972, p. 777). 
If a firm does not own all its inputs, the presumed power to manage and assign workers to 
various tasks is the same as an individual consumer's power to manage and assign his grocer 
to various tasks. A consumer can assign his grocer to the task of obtaining whatever the 
consumer can induce the grocer to provide at a price acceptable to both parties. That is 
precisely all that an employer can do with an employee. 
The economic organization through which input owners cooperate will make better use 
of their comparative advantages to the extent that it facilitates the payment of rewards in 
accord with productivity. If rewards were random, and without regard to productive effort, 
no incentive fot productive effort would be provided by the organization. Two key demands 
are placed on an economic organization: metering input productivity and payment of 
rewards. 
Metering problems sometimes can be well resolved through the exchange of products 
across competitive markets, because in many situations markets yield a high correlation 
between rewards and productivity. Team production is production in which 1) several types 
of resources are used and 2) the product is not a sum of separable outputs of each cooperating 
resource. In team production, marginal products of cooperative team members are not so 
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directly related to rewards. What a team offers to the market can be taken as the marginal 
product of the team but not of the team members. 
Market competition, in principle, could monitor some team production. Market 
competition among potential team members would determine team membership and 
individual rewards. Incumbent members will be constrained by threats of replacement by 
outsiders offering services for lower reward shares or offering greater rewards to the other 
members of the team. Monitoring cannot measure output performance, apportioning 
rewards, observing the input behavior of inputs as means of detecting or estimating their 
marginal productivity, and give assignments or instructions in what to do and how to do it. 
Managing or examining the ways to which inputs are used in team production is a 
method of metering the marginal productivity of individual inputs to the team's output. The 
relationship of each team member to the owner of the firm is simply a "quid pro quo" 
contract. Each makes a purchase and sale. The e.Q1ployee "orders" the owner of the team to 
pay him money in the same sense that the employer directs the team member to perform 
certain functions. 
Two necessary conditions exist for the emergence of the firm. It is possible to increase 
productivity through team-oriented production. It is economical to estimate marginal 
productivity by observing or specifying input behavior. Ordinary contracts facilitate efficient 
specialization according to comparative advantage, a special class of contracts among a 
group of joint inputs to a team production process is commonly used for team production. 
A central common party to a set ofbilateral contracts facilitates efficient organization of the 
joint inputs in team production. 
The term of the contracts forms the basis of the entity called the firm. Team 
productive activity is that in which a union, or joint use, of inputs yields a larger output than 
the sum of the products of the separately used inputs. This team production requires an 
assessment of marginal productivities if efficient production is to be achieved. 
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2. TheFirm 
Restricted to those organizations or individuals which produce marketable output, then 
one definition of a firm could be any person or collection of people who turn inputs into 
outputs. This definition also means the exclusion of many forms of government activity as 
well (Sawyer 1979, p. 10). In economic theory we find that the allocation of factors of 
production between different uses is determined by the price mechanism. In other words, 
the costs of organizing within the firm will be equal either to the costs of organizing in 
another firm or to the costs involved in leaving the transaction to be "organized" by the price 
mechanism (Oliver 1991, p.30). 
Businessmen will be constantly experimenting and controlling factors of production 
and more or less, in this way, equilibrium will be maintained. This is the position of 
equilibrium for static analysis. But it is clear that the dynamic factors are also of 
considerable importance, and an investigation of the effect changes have on the cost of 
organizing within the firm and on marketing costs must be made. This will generally enable 
one to explain why firms get larger and smaller. This moving equilibrium appears to have 
clarified the relationship between initiative or enterprise and management. Initiative means 
forecasting and operates through the price mechanism by the making of new contracts. 
Management proper merely reacts to price changes, and rearranges the factors of production 
under its control. 
3. Market Economy 
There must be firms in a market economy. Consumers alone could not establish the 
market prices through their own decisions. Individuals come into a market each day 
prepared to perform productive services at some price. Among these individuals would be 
specialists in specific functions and specialists in co-ordination. For capital in the form of 
productive implements has to be provided in order that the workers can produce an 
"efficient" quantity of output (Malmgren 1961, p. 400). Owners of capital goods could offer 
the services of such goods, the market price mechanism would allocate resources and 
services to their most efficient uses. 
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Coase proposed an explanation as to why firms should arise in such markets. As 
explained by Oliver, Coase suggested that the distinguishing characteristic of the firm is the 
supersession of the price mechanism. The most obvious reason for this is that there are costs 
of using the price mechanism. Coase's view depends upon uncertainty about the current and 
future states of events. Because of uncertainty the competitive price mechanism in a market 
of individual producers and consumers breaks down. The lack of information about a range 
of events that firms have put together, long-term contracts, and regulated markets for clearly 
defined services can be developed leads to this uncertainty (Oliver 1961, p. 401). Taking this 
perspective we can say that there is a definite transaction cost in using the price mechanism; 
it is the costs of collecting information on the relevant sets of events. 
A perfectly competitive static economy generally assumes that all buyers and sellers 
know all the relevant prices in the system in order that equilibrium be attained. There still 
remains the problem of the determination of the "correct" prices ifthe market is not initially 
at equilibrium. In the absence of universal omniscience, buyers and sellers would have to 
be allowed to explore the market for this correct price. 
4. Information and Expectation 
Multi-person and multi-process firms arise in a market economy for a number of 
reasons which are corollary to the existence.oftransaction, or information, cost. To begin 
with, they gain an advantage over the market in certain areas of production and sales by 
reducing or eliminating the cost of finding out relevant prices. As a result a number of 
long-term contracts are arranged. Operating rules of quite simple nature replace a more 
thorough analysis of every possible transaction which might arise in market-determined 
allocation or resources over the set of activities which make up the firm. 
· This stabilization of events extends into the market transactions which remain acting 
as an integrated market. Stabilization is characterized by the holding of inventories, buying 
and selling in a way which tends to reduce fluctuations and thus costs. The firm predicts the 
costs of production of its goods. Moreover, it will be better than the market could perform 
over its set of activities by eliminating the divergence of expectations which may arise when 
interdependent decisions are taken by independent decision-makers. 
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In relation to reaching equilibrium we may prefer to consider equilibrium in terms of 
the individual firm's plan. Equilibrium for the individual firm exists only for actions which 
make up a consistent plan. Any change in information would disrupt that equilibrium and 
create conditions for a new one. Equilibrium can exist only so long as the actions planned 
prove correct. If they prove incorrect, the change in planning data would require a 
rearrangement of the plan according to the new information if the plan were to be efficient. 
Everyone would have to base his expectations on the same set of events as everyone else, and 
come to the same conclusions, or plans would have to be quite independent with respect to 
their consequences. 
5. Investment and Finance 
Most of these so-called theories ofthe firm are only concerned with the conversion of 
a service stream into a flow of output. The dominant theory, the neoclassical theory of the 
firm, ignores both investment and finance, modeling firms as purchasing the services of 
durable goods and labor in the perfect rental and labor markets. The neoclassical theory of 
production is satisfactory for some purposes, but itis not a general theory of firm behavior. 
The competitive firm invests in all types of assets, financing these procurement in various 
ways; this behavior has enormous effects on the firm's output decision. 
A fundamentally sound theory of capitalistic production integrates firm investment and 
finance. The firm is simply an aggregation of assets, and maximizes its long-run profits by 
varying its asset and liability structures. Also, it must decide not only in which assets to 
invest, but also how to use the services generated by the real assets. 
The important variables are the size, date, and risk of the cash flows generated by the 
assets. The firm must decide whether to finance its current and future operations by 
borrowing, new equity issues, or through internal funding. Production and money capital 
constraints are the subject of firm's choices. The production constraints on the firm are an 
enumeration of all the different output streams which can be obtained from given resources 
and include the ways these streams are affected by varying the use that is made of potential 
resources. The firm is assumed to be a perfect competitor in an uncertain environment. 
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6. Optimization 
Given the need for a more robust theory of the optimization of the firm, the work is 
motivated also by the pragmatic objective of developing sounder policies for efficient 
business behavior. What should the firm optimize? We need to consider what form of a 
maxim should the firm take. The optimization problem will depend on the owners of the 
firm. 
In the general case this will involve the maximization of the value, what we shall call 
the economic value of the ownership investment in the finn (Vickers 1968, p.8). This in turn 
involves the maximization of the capitalized value and present discounted value of the 
income stream the business can be expected to generate. 
The view implicitly is the economic value of the asset investment at work in the firm. 
Also, to be ascertained is whether the structure of income-generating assets to which 
investable funds have been committed is in some sense, an optimum structure. The 
investments that have been financed comprise, in some similar sense, an optimum structure 
of financing sources. Thus optimization objective will involve the optimization of the 
productive and operating structure of the finn. This will lead to the concept of "sequential 
decision-making" points, at which the enterprise structure is examined for its consistency. 
7. Public Enterprise 
In any country, public enterprise (PE) has reached a certain degree of industrial and 
social development. Its.development is due to a variety of motives, pressures, and purposes 
which differ from country to country, and from government to government. Practical needs 
of nation-wide development of a utility or commodity for which private investment capital 
is not available or sufficient, appears to be the predominant reason for the establishment of 
PEs (Hanson 1955, pp. 11-12). 
Aharoni characterizes PEs as explained by Volsgang, as having three properties. The 
enterprise has to be publicly owned. It has to produce private goods, and it has to sell these 
goods at a price related to cost (V olsgang 1990, p. 2). PEs are traditionally active in areas 
that are loaded with externalities and other public goods aspects. Also, PEs are often 
purposefully located in particularly backward areas so they provide for infrastructure to 
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Many PEs produce under increasing returns to scale due to indivisible inputs which makes 
their production semi-public. 
A particularly fertile field for PEs has been underdeveloped countries covering vast 
and relatively poor areas into readily accessible industrial resources. With limited resources, 
the State must invariably intervene to develop public utilities which are not attractive to 
private capital. The need for a basic national economic development in underdeveloped 
countries, and the satisfaction of urgent defense and strategic needs, are among the most 
widely accepted and frequent motives for establishing PEs. Beyond this area, the scope of 
PEs are the object of political, economic, and philosophical controversy. In fact, PEs have 
played an important, indeed an indispensable part in the development of all these countries. 
There are approximately three main types of PEs. First, is administration by 
government department. As the tasks of modern government increased, whether the causes 
were defense needs, economic crises, or new social demands, government departments found 
themselves saddled with an increasing variety of enterprises of an essentially economic 
character. Obviously, neither the routine nor the training of the civil service was adapted to 
these new tasks which were often specialized and highly technical. 
Second, is the joint stock company governed by company law but controlled by public 
authority as principal shareholder. The use of the commercial company as a form of PEs in 
which the State itself, or a public authority on behalf of the State, exercises control through 
the ownership of a majority of the shares. Sometimes, this control is reinforced by the 
reservation of special privileges in the bylaws ofthe company. This is the most wide-spread 
form of industrial PEs. The State has stepped into economic and industrial management, this 
may be as a result of pressures and emergencies rather than as a result of deliberate policy. 
The intervention of the State may have been the result of economic depression, defense 
needs, defends for the development of certain scarce but important, and costly natural 
resources. 
Third, is the public corporation proper. It is based on the recognition of the 
participation of the State in economic enterprise. The characteristic features of public 
corporation are as follows: each public corporation is separately established by statute and 
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it is an individual. The public corporation is an independent corporation with separate legal 
personality. Its administration is in the hands of a governing board appointed by the 
government. The employees are not civil servants. 
8. The Role of PEs 
As a publicly owned corporation that produce private goods, the government retains 
some authority to intervene directly in the delegated production arrangements and effect 
major policy changes when it is deemed necessary to do so (Lawson 1994, p.283). Such 
enterprises, have multiple objectives, answer to several different ministries, and operate 
under peculiar constraints. PEs concentrates on the motives for state ownership boil down 
to ideological and economic. For socialists it may be important in order to influence or 
control the overall direction of the economy. The economic reasons revolve around the 
issues of natural monopoly, the need for economic planning, the advantages for stabilization 
policy direct industrial intervention, and the redistribution of power, income, or wealth. 
On the other side, it is sometimes recommended as a device to protect the consumer 
from the excesses of monopoly power. Wealth redistribution depends on the terms and 
conditions attached to ownership change, while income redistribution is influenced by the 
firm's prices and wages. In advanced market economies, PEs role is around the exploitation 
of their monopoly power, either natural or created by state license, to raise revenue for the 
state. Also, an equally prominent role has been the promotion of industrial development. 
In the context of developing economies, PEs may have a role in galvanizing domestic 
manufacturing activity, providing infra-structural services, or winning and channeling 
foreign economic assistance. This is because the capital markets are not always fully 
developed, and risk-bearing ability or willingness by private entrepreneurs is deemed 
inadequate for national needs. But, even though there is an economic argument, that the 
output has some public goods' characteristic, all that this may indicate is the need for public 
subsidy to prevent under-provision (Baumol 1984, p.14). The search for appropriate 
institutional forms, the enforcement of efficiency and the stimulation of innovation are the 
key desirable properties. 
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There are normative reasons for the existence of PEs in certain ideological arguments, 
and in some cost-minimizing solutions where the unfettered private solution is thought to be 
undesirable, or in the case of some developing economies where the solution is unattainable. 
In countries where the public finance and social welfare systems are underdeveloped, then 
PEs pricing policies can be an effective way of achieving redistribution. But, this may 
simply be a means to effect a less visible income and wealth redistribution that could be 
obtained by direct transfer (Vogelsang 1990, p. 17). Direct redistribution is more precise 
than redistribution by regulation. 
9. Modeling and Consequences 
Among property-rights theorists, De Alessi stresses that the public at large cannot 
specialize in the firm's internal activity. So, the public has only weak incentives to check 
on PEs performance. He assumes that the managers derive utility from being able to control 
resources and this provides them with an incentive to increase their expenditures. The 
barriers to growth of managerial discretion are substantially lower, especially when the 
organization produces non-marketable outputs (Lawson 1994, p. 287). By increasing the 
resources under his provision, a bureaucrat will generate an increase in his marginal product 
and usually in his salary. This can be achieved by using unrealistically low discount rates 
to justify a relatively unproductive investment project. 
Shapiro models the activities of the bureau responsible for the projects by assuming 
that management wishes to maximize its salary by maximizing the organization budget 
through lobbying the legislature. The legislature approves the budget, but it and the public 
are more interested in the benefits the agency can deliver than in the allocative efficiency of 
the selected projects or the technical efficiency with which they are performed. Budgets are 
typically treated as either exogenous or mechanically derived from congressional demand 
functions (Lindsay 1976, p.1 063). Because of the political costs of raising taxes, the shadow 
price of government funds is high, which makes increasing PEs profits an "attractive 
objective" (Vogelsang 1990, p.55). Profit maximization is an adequate specification of the 
goal because they lay particular stress on organizational processes. 
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The motivation for such inter-authority payments is often damaging allocative 
efficiency. Goal formation should have a central role in PEs behavior. Because managers 
cannot directly own property rights in PEs, it is argued that they have only weak incentives 
to take a long-run view of its development. Also, government intervention reduces rewards 
and raises costs to the PEs. 
If managerial salaries are linked to the size of the firm's budget, then inadequate 
monitoring can encourage increased expenditure. The limited monitoring ability of the 
political authorities can produce unintended consequences (Lindsay 197 6, p. 1064 ). 
Congress can only monitor certain aspects or output, so the quality of other aspects of the 
product will deteriorate. 
Inadequate monitoring and non-profit objectives suggests that PEs are less likely to 
. introduce cost-saving innovations and achieve cost minimizing. Because capital is provided 
at subsidized rates PEs are likely to have too capital intensive of a production technique. 
More generally, production subsidies Vogelsang points out may cause rent-seeking. In 
addition, lack of market competition and multiplicity of objective are the predominant 
sources of PEs inefficiency. 
D. PRIVATIZATION AND FORMS OF PRIVATIZATION 
In seven of the ten arrangements the private sector is the producer: contract, grant, 
voucher, franchise, market, voluntary, and self-service. These can be considered 
private-sector arrangements. The arrangement in hierarchical order are as follows: market, 
voluntary, self-service, franchise, voucher, grant, contract, government vending, 
intergovernmental agreement, and governmental. But, the privatization is a dynamic concept 
and means changing from an arrangement with high government involvement to one with 
less (Savas 1987, p. 88). Privatization means changing to an arrangement where the private 
sector plays a more dominant role. 
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1. The Theory 
Property-rights arrangements provide the key to understanding the behavior of private 
and public employees and the performance of private and public enterprises. When private 
enterprises produce goods and services that consumers demand, at costs that are lower than 
market prices, profits are generated. Alternatively, if losses are realized, the value of private 
assets declines. Hence, the owners of private firms not only appropriate the gains but also 
bear the costs that result from the way in which private property is used. 
Private owners face significant incentives that make it desirable to monitor the 
behavior of private-enterprise managers and employees, so that they will supply what 
consumers demandant in a cost effective way (Hanke 1985, p. 102). Consequently, private 
managers and employees find it difficult to engage in shirking behavior or behavior that is 
inconsistent with maximizing the present value of the private enterprise. Private property 
puts in place incentives that tend to generate effi~ient performances. 
By way of contrast, PEs are not owned by individuals who have residual claim on the 
assets of the organizations. The nominal owners of PEs, the "taxpayer-owner" cannot buy 
and sell public enterprise assets. Consequently, they do not have strong incentives to monitor 
the behavior of public managers and employees. Moreover, public managers and employees 
allocate resources that do not belong to them. They do not bear the costs of their decisions, 
nor do they appropriate the gains from efficient behavior. Since the nominal owners of PEs 
have little incentive to monitor public managers and employees, the cost of shirking to a 
public bureaucrat is low. Consequently, public managers and employees would probably 
engage in shirking activity and acquisition of various perquisites that increase production 
cost. 
Private owners bear the costs and capture the benefits associated with implementing 
their plans. PEs also plan, but their plans are fundamentally different from private plans. 
This is because they are developed by bureaucrats. Bureaucrats who neither bear the cost 
of their mistakes nor legally capture the benefits generated by foresight. Hence, from a 
theoretical point of view, private and public managers and employees can be expected to 
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behave in different ways and, as a result, private firms will be more efficient than public 
firms. 
Another axiom of privatization is related to the management of the program. It is 
important that such programs be managed as effectively as possible. One difficulty with 
doing this is often little management continuity from one program to the next. As a 
consequence, management mistakes, in the form of excessive agency costs, are unfortunately 
repeated and economic and human resources are misallocated (Hogan 1994, p.15). 
Privatization promise stems from its ability to deal with agency problems by supplying 
management linkages missing from other approaches. These linkages allow administrators 
to reach program objectives efficiently and expeditiously. 
Privatization opportunities would allow firms to compete more effectively worldwide 
and eliminate costly subsidies to money losing PEs. Privatization provides a much-needed 
foundation for economic stability and to initiate a market economy. Public firms' costs are 
often greater than they are in private firms. 
2. Privatization Form 
Aside from its fundamental role, government is engaged in planning, paying for, and 
producing various goods and services. To privatize means to rely more on the private 
institutions of society and less on government to satisfy people's needs. More narrowly, 
privatization is the act of increasing the role of the private sector, or decreasing the role of 
government, in an activity or in the ownership of assets. 
Government activity or PEs can be privatized by three broad strategies: divestment, 
delegation, and displacement (Savas 1990, p.345). First divestment, divestment means 
shedding an enterprise or asset. This requires a direct, positive act by government. The 
enterprise or asset is either sold or given away as an ongoing business, or an enterprise may 
be liquidated. Divestment by sale can be carried out in five ways: 1) selling the enterprise 
to a single buyer; 2) selling to the public by issuing and selling shares; 3) selling the 
enterprise to the managers; 4) selling to the employees; and 5) selling the enterprise to its 
users or its customers. Divestment by donation does not require sale of an enterprise; the 
latter could be given away, for example to employees, to users, or to customer. Divestment 
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liquidation can be carried out by liquidating a poorly performing enterprise, if the prospects 
are bleak for achieving profitability. 
Secondly, delegation requires a continuing active role for government. Government 
delegates to the private sector part or all of the activity of producing goods or services, but 
government retains the responsibility to oversee the result. Delegation is carried out by 
contract, franchise, grant, voucher, or mandate. Finally, displacement is a somewhat more 
passive process that leads to government being displaced more or less gradually by the 
private sector. Displacement occurs by default, by withdrawal, and by deregulation. 
3. Method of Privatization 
Privatization is a field that does not permit dogmatic treatment. The choice of 
privatization techniques is generally a function of the government's objectives, the PEs 
condition and its sector of activity, and the country characteristic (Vuylsteke 1988, p.3). 
Obviously, the profitability of PEs are one of the determinants of how easy or how difficult 
its sale will be. Privatization potential is not limited to a strong performing PEs. Where 
widespread share ownership is desired, a public offering should be the preferred method; but 
the near absence of financial markets and the concentration of domestic private capital and 
entrepreneurial expertise may not permit a public offering. 
When privatizing public utilities, regulatory aspects will be paramount. When setting 
the objectives of a privatization program, it may be necessary to allow for trade-off, based 
on the feasibility of techniques relative to a given set of objectives. The more difficult issues 
are commonly the financial condition, excessive liabilities, and financial markets. 
Employment effects are commonly considered a major constraint to privatization as well. 
Every privatization undertaking needs to be carefully planned and managed. 
The most commonly used methods of privatization are: 
• Public Offering of Share 
• Public Sale of Shares 
• New Private Investment in PEs 
• Sale of Government or PEs Assets 
• Reorganization (Or Break-up) into Component Parts 
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• Management I Employee Buy Out 
• Lease and Management Contract 
Several of these methods can bring about total divestiture or denationalization or can 
be implemented partially or gradually. The choice of a particular method will be dictated by 
the objectives being sought and other factors. 
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III ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
A. CRISIS AND REFORM 
1. Political and Economy 
The political collapse that accompanied the state of economic chaos in Indonesia in the 
1960s was a major crisis. Runaway inflation had peaked at 595 percent in 1965. A myriad 
of microeconomic distortions had created serious economic disarray. The extent of 
macroeconomic imbalance had also made it impossible for the most productive economic 
sectors to grow. With the collapse of old regime, new opportunity was opened. The new 
government replaced a policy of easy money with a policy of fiscal balance (Williamson 
1994, p. 386). This bold change was initiated by a group of economists, who later became 
known as the economic technocrats. 1 The outcomes of the reforms were quite dramatic: the 
inflation rate dropped to less than 115 percent in 1967, 17 percent in 1969, and 19 percent 
in 1973. Output in the agricultural and the manufacturing sector increased, gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth revived, reaching 9.2 percent in 1970, and 14 percent in 1973. 
The crisis of the 1980s was propelled by the worldwide economic recession of 
1982-1983 and by a plunge in oil prices w.hich affected the Indonesian economy. The 
government responded immediately and fairly forcefully to the external shock. A series of 
measures within a wide-ranging stabilization and structural adjustment program were 
introduce. Part of the program was reflected by the implementation of a balanced budget 
policy, such as budget cuts and postponing major industrial projects. On the revenue side, 
the government moved to non-oil revenues through a major tax reform. 
With the fall of oil prices, the capacity of the state to provide the funds for its industrial 
strategy has been seriously eroded. Pressures to move Indonesia's emphasis from 
import-substitution industrialization to export-oriented industrialization have been 
strengthened (Robison 1987, p.16.). This policy implies a greater integration with the new 
1 This group was labeled the "Berkeley mafia" because most of its members had been educated at 
University ofBerkeley. 
33 
international division of labor. The policy successes will be determined by several factors. 
For example, factors such as commodity prices and the capacity of the state to resolve fiscal · 
crises, political struggle between international corporate capital and financial institutions, 
struggle between liberal reformist elements of the domestic technocracy on one hand and the 
bureaucratic and corporate forces whose interests are vested in the current industrial strategy 
on the other hand. Moreover, a value-added tax was introduced in 1985 in the manufacturing, 
construction sectors, and fuel oils. An additional tax was also applied to luxury goods sold 
in the domestic markets. These tax reforms dramatically increased the shares of oil and non-
oil receipts in the budget. In the following years, income and land tax revenues increased 
resulting in a dramatic jump in total non-oil revenues of around 30 percent in the period from 
1987 to 1990. 
Reform was also made in monetary policy. During the oil boom, monetary policy had 
been based primarily on two mechanisms: credit ceilings and interest rate controls of state 
banks. The plunge in oil prices led to a shortfall in government revenues and a balance of 
payment deficits. This forced the government to promulgate monetary and financial reforms. 
These reforms were aimed at dismantling the old system of monetary control, and replacing 
it with a more indirect approach based on reserve management through open market 
operations. Meanwhile the government took a strong stance on maintaining the stability of 
the exchange rates and domestic prices. This prudence has paid off with inflation remaining 
under control and in the single digits. This has resulted in a stable real exchange rate and 
greater competitiveness (Williamson 1994, p. 391). The GDP rose on average by 5.1 percent 
per year during 1983-86 and 6.4 percent 1986-90. 
The policy direction proposed to reform the economy was using pro market 
mechanisms. This recommendation came from a single group of people, namely the 
economic technocrats. Their approach is pragmatic, professionally based, and is little 
influenced by party politics and ideology. The concrete outcomes of their strategy is a rising 
standard of living, sustained rapid growth, low inflation, and the enhancement of 
infrastructure throughout the country. Fortunately, this economic team has received the full 
support of the president. This support is a factor of utmost importance. The blessing of the 
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president has strengthened the implementation of some difficult decisions. For example, a 
courageous decision to devalue the currency in 1983 and 1986 originally encountered great 
resistance among some interest groups, but the devaluations were implemented anyway. The 
consequences were positive, as export growth accelerated while inflation was kept at a 
single-digit level. 
The responses to this crisis from Indonesia came just at the time when the crisis was 
becoming apparent. To balance the budget, the World Bank argued for the removal of 
extensive fuel and food subsidies and the immediate development of domestic revenue 
sources to replace declining oil taxes. The World Bank also called for a reduction in state 
investment in large resource and industrial projects. This recommendation was to correct 
what the World Bank regarded as an irrational pattern of investment and an inappropriate 
industrial strategy. According to the principles of comparative advantage, the World Bank 
officials urged that the Indonesian economy be allowed to respond to the free operation of 
the international division of labor. Removal of state subsidies and protections would make 
way for the replacement of inefficient and costly industries. (Robison 1987, pp.29-30) 
2. Industrial Strategy 
The consolidation of the power ofthe state and government officials was through the 
process of industrialization and the emergence of major domestic corporate groups that were 
built around oil revenues. Consequently, the collapse of oil prices posed a fundamental 
threat to the fabric of power and government policies in Indonesia. At the heart of the 
upheaval has been the question of economic strategy and industrial policy. 
Meanwhile, there has been a remarkable continuity in certain key aspects oflndonesian 
economic policy. Two important ideological factors have underpinned this continuity. First, 
it has been generally accepted by successive governments that the state has a legitimate 
economic role and that market forces must be tempered by social objectives. Second, it has 
also been accepted that foreign ownership and control of the Indonesian economy be 
restrained, that the nurturing of domestic investment must be a priority and that a significant 
degree of national autonomy is the basic objective in shaping the structure of the economy 
(Robison 1987, p. 17). This element of economic nationalism has had important 
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implications for industrial' policy, because these policies have meant that the drive to 
establish capital and intermediate goods sectors has been a central investment objective. 
At the ideological level, nationalism and social justice are powerful legacies of the 
anti-colonial struggle, the vision of an autonomous, powerful, industrial Indonesia has been 
a driving force behind long-term economic strategy. Economic strategy has been meshed 
with the interests of the dominant political strata: the politico-bureaucrats who exercise 
hegemony over the state apparatus. State power to intervene in and to regulate the economy 
has been subject to appropriation by politico-bureaucrats not only to shape the pattern of vast 
state investments but also to control the allocation of state concessions for the private sector 
(Glassbumer 1971, pp.80-81). 
This political control over the economy has provided the sources of revenues, 
patronage and power that underpins the dominance of state officials in both socio-economic 
and political levels. Policies of economic nationalism and state intervention have provided 
the basis for the emergence of major corporate conglomerates, both public and private. State 
corporations as well as major private groups have been built upon monopoly positions and 
preferential access to licenses, supply and credit, all derived from the intervention of the state 
in the economy. Combined with extensive protection of these domestic groups through 
tariffs and restrictions on foreign investment in certain sectors of the economy, economic 
nationalism have been essential to the emerging domestic capitalist class. 
Policies of state-led import-substitution industrialization had became integral to the 
interests of the alliance of economic and politico-bureaucratic power. The Department of 
Industry is now able to exert more influence in this area and has began a concerted move 
towards industrial deepening and the creation of backwards and forwards linkages in 
manufacture that are designed to establish self generating, mutually reinforcing, sectoral 
growth. This has involved heavy state investment in steel and other metal industries, 
petro-chemicals, oil refining and liquid natural gas production, fertilizers, machine tool 
production and the provision of infrastructure (Gray, 1982). 
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3. Progress on Development 
Since the new government, Indonesia has made great strides, achieving an average 
GDP growth of almost 7 percent per annum. This growth performance ranks among the ten 
fastest in the world. Indonesia's per capita income reached$ 650 in 1992 and$ 905 in 19942, 
implying a substantial improvement in living standards. But, Indonesia is still classified as 
a low income country. Consistent emphasis on maintaining economic stability, marked by 
the willingness to make hard decisions in times of both boom and bust, provided a solid 
foundation for sustained growth. 
Prudence was exercised during the years of the oil boom, and the oil windfalls were 
spread over time and across sectors in a manner that avoided the erosion of the non-oil 
sectors that has plagued most other oil-exporting countries. The development strategy 
emphasized channeling oil revenues into raising agricultural output and developing physical 
and social infrastructure. The development of infrastructure strengthened the foundations for 
future growth. 
A series of external shocks to the economy have affected these development and 
sharply reduced exports and fiscal revenues. This has created sizable external and domestic 
financial imbalances, and raised the cost of external debt service. The government 
responded promptly and effectively by embarking on adjustment program: restoring 
macroeconomic stability and monetary restraint and establishing a more diversified and 
efficient productive base through structural reforms and reduced the dependence on oil. The 
strategy to develop the non-oil economy has two main thrusts: promotion of the private 
sector and encouragement of a more outward-oriented economic structure. The structural 
reforms were developed within a comprehensive medium-term framework that fostered 
credibility through consistent implementation (World Bank 1994, p. 3). This strategy was 
successful in stabilizing the economy, maintaining growth and transforming the structure of 
production. 
2 According to The Far East and Australasia 1996, 27th edition. 
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Macroeconomic management also substantially reduced the current account and fiscal 
deficit. Prudence in external borrowing allowed Indonesia to service its debt without 
requiring any rescheduling. Supported by prompt macroeconomic stabilization measures and 
structural reforms that has spurred competition and enlarged the opportunities for growth, 
the economy rebounded quickly from effects of these shocks. The major force driving 
economic recovery was the private sector, as private investment has responded vigorously 
to the policies of deregulation. The private sector contributed over 70 percent of the total 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth during the years of 1983-1991. 
A strong surge in private investment, responding to the incentive and regulatory 
reform, combined with an easing of monetary policy, has led to the emergence of excess 
demand pressures. The government responded by tightening monetary and fiscal policies 
and restraining public and publicly external borrowing, which helped dampen the demand 
pressures. At the same time, the government continued to build on earlier reforms in trade 
policy and investment and industrial regulations. 
Moreover, Indonesia in reduction of poverty is attributable to several elements of its 
development strategy: substantial investment in economic and social infrastructure that 
supported sustained, broad-based growth; strong emphasis on improving productivity in 
agriculture, the source of livelihood for the majority of the population and the overwhelming 
bulk of the rural poor; structural reforms that induced a shift from inward-oriented, 
capital-intensive activities toward export-oriented, labor-intensive; and cushioning of the 
impact of adjustment on expenditure programs beneficial to the poor. Evidence of the 
distribution of income, personal and regional, is more limited than evidence on poverty, but 
there has been a gradual reduction of disparities in income. (World Bank 1994, p.5) 
B. SUSTAINING DEVELOPMENT 
The past successes have enabled the government to build on a strong economic 
foundation. At the same time, there needs to be a clear recognition of the formidable 
challenges for sustaining development that lie ahead. Future challenges stem both from the 
fact that, despite past progress, Indonesia remains a low income country, with a sizable 
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segment of its population still living in absolute poverty. The task is to sustain development 
and maintain a robust pace of economic growth to improve the living standards and provide 
gainful employment to the rapidly expanding labor force, and promoting equity by reducing 
poverty and broadening participation in development. 
1. Growth With Stability 
Sustained robust growth is central to achieving Indonesia's development objectives. 
To employ the labor force, which increases annually, non oil GDP must grow. Sustaining 
this rate of growth is a major challenge. A stable macroeconomic foundation is a necessary 
condition for sustained economic growth (World Bank 1994, p.ll). In maintaining a stable 
macroeconomic environment, the primary challenge stems from Indonesia's large external 
debt. In absolute terms, Indonesia's external debt is now one of the largest in the developing 
world. The debt burden is heavy and it limits Indonesia's policy flexibility and raises its 
vulnerability to external shocks. A central goal of macroeconomic management is to reduce 
this burden gradually to levels that are more sustainable in the medium to long term. 
Sustaining robust non-oil export growth is the key to reducing the external deficit. To 
achieve and sustain a non-oil GDP growth, the investment rate will need to rise. Reconciling 
the higher investment rate with the need to reduce the current account deficit will require an 
increase in the national saving rate. This underscores the need to intensify domestic resource 
mobilization. One challenge will be to manage a smooth transition to an increased role of 
private capital in external financing and to diversify the sources and types of financing. 
Also, to promote greater foreign direct investment that will reduce the need for debt-creating 
flows, and providing new technologies and market access. 
Furthermore, policies for growth must adapt to the evolving nature of the growth 
process. Success in sustaining the momentum of growth will depend greatly on how 
effectively Indonesia manages some important dimensions of this evolution. This will 
include both the :fulldamental qualitative shifts in the growth process and major structural 
transformations in the economy. This comprises an increasingly important role of 
improvements in efficiency and productivity as a source of growth and a transition from 
quantity to quality in the production of goods and services. 
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In the increasingly tougher international business climate, marked by globalization and 
keener competition, raising efficiency and productivity would be the key to sustaining the 
dynamism of non-oil exports. That will remain the premium engine oflndonesia's economic 
growth and diversification. Besides exports, efficiency and productivity improvements hold 
the key to the role the domestic market will play in future growth. The critical need is to 
foster increased competition, not only by opening the economy further to competition from 
abroad, but also by intensifying efforts to remove barriers to competition within the domestic 
economy. More broadly, raising efficiency and productivity will be essential to realizing 
Indonesia's growth objectives within the limits of available resources. 
A transition from quantity to quality in the production of goods and services is closely 
related to raising efficiency and productivity. In the public sector, this implies a shift of 
focus from expanding services to improving their quality. In private sector, improving the 
quality of goods, and the developing new products, will become increasingly important 
sources of market growth. In addition, to be the dominant provider of private goods and 
services, the private sector is expected to play an increased role in the provision of public 
services that may be provided within a competitive framework. 
2. Equity Through Wider Participation 
The promotion of an equitable pattern of economic growth has been a major goal of 
the Government. In pursuing this goal, Indonesia will face three related requirements. There 
will be a continuing effort to reduce poverty in the long run, ensuring widespread regional 
participation in development, and promoting broad-based private sector growth. Progress 
in reducing poverty over the past two decades has been impressive, but about 27 million 
people, 15 percent of the population, remain below the poverty line (World Bank 1994, p. 
14). 
The first thrust of a poverty reduction strategy is the achievement of sustained 
economic growth. A review of evidence across developing countries suggests that economic 
growth is a major factor in the reduction of poverty. Economies with sustained economic 
growth and increased efficiency of resources use have generally experienced significant 
reductions in poverty (World Bank 1990, p.35). Growth and poverty reduction in Indonesia 
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are largely complementary, because of the flexible nature oflndonesia's labor markets. The 
continuation of macroeconomic policies aimed at achieving a sustainable recovery in growth, 
while maintaining stability will be an important prerequisite for further reductions in poverty. 
Achieving a more rapid rate of economic growth could have a dramatic effect on the 
incidence of absolute poverty. 
During the 1990s, the principal sources of growth will be non-oil exports, especially 
manufactured exports- and non-rice agricultural production. The manufacturing sector will 
continue to be an important source of economic growth and employment generation over the 
mid-term. The most promising route for employment expansion in the manufacturing sector 
is to enhance profitability of the export industries, since these industries are relatively labor 
intensive and have the best prospects for market growth. This requires an appropriate 
framework to boost manufactured exports. The key elements of this framework is the 
maintenance of a competitive exchange rate and continued progress on trade and industrial 
sector reforms, in order to reduce the domestic cost of production. 
The agriculture sector will continue to play a critical role in providing better income 
opportunities to farmers, and supporting the development of rural off-farm employment by 
stimulating production of non-rice crops, smallholder tree crops and non-food farm activities. 
More rapid and efficient growth in agriculture and manufacturing will also spur growth in 
the services sector. Higher growth is likely to lead to improved earnings for workers 
currently engaged in low-wage activities, as well as generate additional productive 
employment opportunities in the agriculture sector. (World Bank 1990, pp. 36-37) 
An important fact is that most employment in Indonesia has been and will presumably 
continue to be provided by private sector enterprises. Government actions directly and 
indirectly influencing the level and pattern of labor utilization by private employers and is 
of greatest importance in determining future employment and earnings prospects (World 
Bank 1980, p. 99). Employment growth in large and medium scale enterprises has been low 
even though it has probably accounted for the major share of the increment in 
non-agricultural output. An industrialization strategy that gives greater emphasis to the more 
labor intensive light manufacturing industries would offer greater opportunities for avoiding 
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the inefficiencies and inequities. In addition, a less concentrated process of industrial 
development is conducive to greater dispersion in the location of industry and would reduce 
the direct and indirect cost of shifting labor to a few primary centers of economic growth. 
C. GROWTH CHALLENGE 
Many external constraints operated on developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Economic shocks, an expanding conditionality norm, growing bilateralism, and changes in 
the multilateral system pressed the developing countries toward greater integration with the 
world economy (Haggard 1995, p.45). This focus on international constraints is partly 
justified by the fact that the reformist trend among developing countries is worldwide. 
However, varied international pressures affect different developing countries in different 
ways. 
Recently, the term globalization has become popular and overlaps significantly with 
the notions of convergence and interdependence (Jones 1995, p.93). Globalization means 
the hegemony of transnational capitalism in general, and the institutional primacy of the 
transnational corporation, in particular. To others, it means the general progress of the 
internationalization of finance, production and economic transactions, the capacities of 
governments for effective action. Furthermore, the significance of globalization is seen to 
lie in the standardization of production technologies and capabilities, world wide, and the 
increasing exposure of all states to a common set of practical problems and competitive 
economic pressures. 
Indonesia's domestic policy will continue to be directed towards optimizing the 
economy's capacity to benefit from a favorable external environment, allowing continued 
strong growth without an acceleration of inflation. Much of this growth will be generated by 
increased exports. However, high imports of both consumption and investment goods 
associated with the strong growth in domestic demand will result in larger current account 
deficits. To address these problems, the government is tightening monetary policy in 
addition to maintaining fiscal restraint. Also, the government intends to implement further 
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measures to liberalize the economy, to reduce inefficiency and business costs, and to increase 
labor productivity (WIS 1995). 
An economic expansion will be fueled by an increase in domestic demand and by 
higher investment activity. An emerging consumer class and a need for infrastructure 
development will provide a continuing supply of business and investment opportunities. 
Major challenges facing Indonesia are accelerating inflation, a widening current account 
deficit, and the erosion oflndonesia competitiveness in the labor-intensive export sectors. 
Strong domestic demand is putting upward pressure on prices and import demand is 
widening the current account deficit. Moreover, the country is plagued by crucial 
infrastructure constraints that could severely obstruct long term growth. Two and a half 
million jobs a year need to be created to accommodate school graduates entering the 
workforce. The economy must also continue to grow at about 7 percent per year. In this 
respect the country's ability to lure foreign invest;ment away from competitors in Asia and 
elsewhere, and boost its export capabilities, will be crucial. Also, the country's external debt 
is not going down. 
On the other hand, with an emerging consumer sector and a need for further 
infrastructure and industrial development, Indonesia provides solid business opportunities 
and a climate conducive to foreign investment. Local corporations will face higher 
borrowing costs because of higher interest rates engineered by a tight monetary policy. 
Corporation with solid reputations will increasingly seek cheaper financing in the capital 
markets or through offshore borrowing in response to higher local interest rates and tighter 
credit conditions. 
Based on the generally favorable external trading conditions and domestic policy 
regime envisaged for the next five years, an annual average growth rate of 7.2 percent is 
forecast for the 1995-2000 period (EIU 1996). Growth is currently fueled by private 
consumption and investment. This rapid expansion of domestic demand is pushing up 
import growth, with the result that the external sector is providing to be a significant drag on 
growth. But, growth will be driven primarily by non-oil exports, which are expected to 
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accelerate in line with the rapid growth in world trade, and an increasing liberalization of the 
trading environment in the Asia-Pacific region in particular. 
1. External Influence 
Recent history has been characterized by substantial variation in the types and 
intensities of shocks affecting the global economy and individual national economies. 
During periods in which these shocks have been large and created major changes in 
macroeconomic conditions, government officials have been confronted with uncertainties 
about the appropriate adjustments in their stabilization policies. Yet if the shocks have 
pronounced cross-border consequences and seem to threaten a crisis condition, governments 
also have a sharply increased incentive to try to manage the crisis (Bryant 1995, p.l 06). The 
many types of cross-border spillovers have gradually increased in intensity. In turn these 
increases are interdependent and this has reduced the effects of an individual nation's policy 
instruments on national variables relative to the effects on the variables in other countries. 
a. International Economy 
During 1993, the world economy grew only about 2 percent, the continuation of 
a slow recovery from the bottom of the most recent downturn in 1991. Low growth in the 
developed industrial economies and continued economic decline in the former Soviet Union 
and in parts of Eastern Europe held back the world economy. In the United States and most 
of the other industrialized countries, the process of industrial restructuring is continuing, 
adding to unemployment, hurting consumer confidence, and placing added pressure on 
government budgets (Jelacic 1994, p.9). 
On the other hand, most of the world's developing areas continue to show 
economic strength. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that developing country 
output accounts for approximately 35 percent of the total world production. This estimate 
highlights the growing role of the East Asian economies, particularly the Chinese economic 
zone (China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong), in establishing a new "fourth pole" for sustaining 
world growth. 
The segments that comprise the world economy - the flows of money and 
information on the one hand, and investment on the other hand - are rapidly merging into one 
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transaction stream. This tl'ow increasingly represents different dimensions of cross-border 
alliances, the strongest integrating force of the world economy. Today's money flows are 
vastly larger than traditional portfolio investments made for the sake of short-term income 
from dividends and interest. Portfolio money flows were once the stabilizers of the 
international economy, flowing from countries of low short-term returns to countries of 
higher short-term returns, thus maintaining an equilibrium (Drucker 1994, pp. 99-100). 
In structural and institutional trade decisions, markets and knowledge are 
important. Labor cost, capital cost, and foreign exchange rates are restraints rather than 
determinants. Traditional direct investment abroad to start or acquire businesses continues 
to grow, and the action is rapidly shifting to alliances such as joint ventures, partnerships, 
knowledge agreements, and outsourcing arrangement. Alliances, formal and informal, are 
becoming the dominant form of economic integration in the world economy. For developed 
economies, distinction between the domestic and international economy has ceased to be a 
reality, however much political, cultural or psychological strength remains in the idea. 
Lesson of the last 40 years is that ipcreased participation in the world economy has become 
the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity. There has been a close correlation 
between a country's domestic economic performance and its participation in the world 
economy (Drucker 1994, p. 104). 
As the world economy moves forward, manufactures are continuing to improve their 
competitiveness in the global economy, according to Steven M. Hronec, worldwide director 
of Arthur Andersen's manufacturing industry practice: (PRNewswire 1995) 
For continued success in global marketplace, manufacturers will need to focus 
on innovative alliances, as well as new approaches to operations improvements 
and cost management, to close the profitability and productivity gaps between 
themselves and their competitors inside and outside. 
Successful manufacturers will be those that use the strategies that cost-effectively meet 
customers' needs. Prosperous manufacturers will result because of continuous improvements 
in efficiency and productivity on the shop floor and by using new approaches to operations 
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management, with customers expecting high-quality products and attentive service. They 
also must continue to streamline product development, to be flexible, and customer-focused. 
Rapid technology changes will continue to make it easier to anticipate and meet customer 
needs. 
b. Regional Environment 
The Asia Pacific regions remains the fastest growing region in the world in this 
past year despite significance fluctuations in global financial markets. The most significant 
reasons for the fluctuations in the economies of the region are, among other events, shifting 
capital flows and rapidly moving exchange rates. Recent economic developments and the 
policies adopted have noted the increasing importance of growing interdependence of 
countries economies. Attaining free and open trade and investment has increased the 
exposure of their economies to market forces from the global financial marketplace. A 
number of significant benefits have accrued, increases the importance of sound, consistent, 
and sustainable macroeconomic policy in maintaining the dynamism of the region. 
Global capital flows have grown substantially over the past years. With the growth of 
capital flows, and the increased reliance of all economies on them, has come increasing 
vulnerability to rapid shifts in the volume and direction of such flows. It is often difficult for 
authorities to determine in advance whether capital inflows ·are driven by short-term 
speculative motives or by longer-term intentions (U.S. Department of State 1995). Another 
factor is the importance of infrastructure development in the region to sustain 
non-inflationary growth toward the 21st century. From a western business point of view, 
Asia is a very good place to grow, especially for businesses that deal with infrastructure-
energy, transportation, and communications. The developing countries overall are going to 
need enormous improvements in infrastructure if they are to sustain their current growth rates 
(Seidenberg 1996, p.363). Domestic and external private resources will increase their role 
to meet the need to invest in physical infrastructure. As the role of private financing in 
infrastructure development increased, a clear need for coordination of public and private 
resources is essential. 
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c. Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
During the decades of the 1970s and 1980s, the Asian newly industrializing 
economies (NIEs) of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have achieved 
phenomenal growth. By the second halfofthe 1980s, however, their growth rates began to 
decelerate owing to a number of adverse factors such as strengthening currencies and rising 
labor cost. On the other hand, expansion among 4 largest ASEAN economies of Malaysia, 
Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia had gained considerable momentum. Since 1989, the 
average growth rate of the ASEAN has surpassed that of Asian NIEs, and the former are 
likely to maintain the lead into the 1990s. 
There are four recently emerged trends that have accounted for the economic 
acceleration in this region (Wu 1991, p. 103). 
First, is the emergence of Japan and the Asian NIEs as the leading capital and 
technology exporters to Southeast Asia. Direct investment from the five countries for the 
ASEAN nations registered an average annual growth rate of 103 percent. Uninterrupted 
capital infusion from Northeast Asia will help to upgrade the manufacturing capability of the 
ASEAN countries. 
Second, along with rising intra-Asian investments is the rapid expansion of 
intra-Asian trade. To a great extent, the substantial increase in intra-Asian trade is a direct 
consequence of the emerging pattern of intra-Asian capital flows that are bringing about a 
higher level of division of labor among the Asian-Pacific economies. 
Third, is the increasing diversification and sophistication of the ASEAN 
economies. Spurred by rising intra-Asian investments and trade, the ASEAN Four are 
embarking on a fundamental shift from their traditional dependence on primary commodities 
to manufacturing and services. 
Finally, another propitious development is the ASEAN governments' increasing 
commitments toward the deregulation, liberalization, and privatization of their economies 
and financial markets. While the pace and extent of deregulation and liberalization differ 
from one ASEAN country to another, the various measures will in all likelihood help to 
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mobilize local resources,· galvanize private-sector initiatives, enhance competition and 
improve overall economic efficiency. 
It is not simply the population, land, and natural resources that give South East 
Asia its promise of long-term economic potential. Fueling their economic vitality is the 
convergence of substantial human and natural resources, geographic location, and 
growth-oriented governmental policies (Gong 1994, p.5). The ASEAN Free Trade Area 
(AFTA), established in 1993, is ASEAN's current vehicle for regional economic cooperation. 
AFT A is aimed at expanding intra-ASEAN trade in manufactured goods and creating an 
integrated market of its 330 million people with a combined GDP of$ 293 billion, which is 
growing at 7 percent a year. 
2. Internal Condition 
The economic expansion that will be fueled by an increase in domestic demand and 
by higher investment activity, an emerging consumer class and a need for infrastructure 
development will provide a continuing supply of business and investment opportunities. 
Major challenges facing Indonesia are accelerating inflation, a widening current account 
deficit, and an erosion in Indonesian competitiveness in the labor-intensive export sectors. 
Strong domestic demand is putting upward pressure on prices and import demand is 
widening the current account deficit. Moreover, the country is plagued by crucial 
infrastructure constraints that may severely obstruct long term growth. Two and a half 
million jobs a year must be created. The economy must also continue to grow at about 7 
percent per year. The country's ability to lure foreign investment away from competitors in 
Asia and elsewhere, and boost its export capabilities, will be crucial. Also, the country's 
external debt is not going down. 
a. Fiscal and Monetary 
In the face of inflationary pressures and a high external debt, fiscal policy will 
remain tight. The budget surplus will be used to retire a portion of the government's external 
debt and to maintain fiscal reserves of the central bank. Non-oil revenues, which have grown 
by an average of 23 percent per year since 1990, are expected to rise by only 13 percent in 
the near future. In monetary policy, the central bank will further tighten its monetary stance 
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to counter inflationary pressures and stem the increase of bad loans on the banking sector's 
balance sheet. The rise in interest rates has had only a limited impact on credit demand. 
Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies so far have not been able to contain the 
rate of inflation, which is likely to exceed the government's target of 9 percent. Strong 
domestic demand and increased investment will make this containment difficult. Exchange 
rate policy has sought to balance the twin objectives of inflation control and external 
competitiveness. To keep exports competitive, the central bank has traditionally guided the 
rupiah down against the United States dollar by an average annual depreciation rate of about 
4 percent. Moreover, the government is expected to intensify efforts to increase the 
collection of domestic taxes and diversify the tax base. The reduction in the rates of personal 
and corporate income tax stipulated in the new laws are expected to stimulate a more rapid 
growth of GDP, and hence of corporate profits and taxable income. 
Foreign investment inflows are expected to continue to expand, reducing the need 
for foreign borrowing and allowing the foreign debt total to ease towards the end of the 
decade. The continued weakness of the banking systein and the growing influence of a small 
group of politically well-connected business conglomerates may lead to a serious erosion of 
confidence among foreign investors and increase the risk of social and political unrest (EIU 
1996). The government will accelerate its program of partial privatization of state owned 
enterprises as a means of generating additional revenue to pay off foreign debts and meet its 
other commitments. 
h. Investment 
Risk for foreign investors will arise from the continued weakness of the banking 
system, the growing influence of small group of politically well-connected conglomerates, 
and the risk of political and social unrest. The process of deregulatory reform in particular 
must place emphasis on liberalizing the still relatively restrictive business and land laws, and 
curbing the rights of regional governments to vet and approve foreign investments in their 
jurisdictions. 
Efforts to attract increased foreign portfolio investment will continue. The 
existing limit on foreign equity ownership of companies listed on the local stock markets is 
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expected to be increased and a large number oflndonesian companies are likely to float their 
equity on foreign markets. The latter step has already been taken by a number of companies, 
including the state owned firms expected to follow suit, and include the electricity company, 
the oil company, and the toll-road operator. Infrastructure needs provide ample opportunity 
for domestic and foreign investment. Foreign investment will increase in response to the 
liberalization measure introduced by the government. The bulk of the approved investment 
projects are targeted to the production of capital goods, raw materials, and components to 
replace imports. Although the value of domestic investment approvals was down, lower 
corporate tax rates, less restrictive rules on joint ventures, and continued infrastructure needs 
and market opportunities are likely to provide the impetus for more domestic investment in 
the future. 
Repelita VI stipulates an annual average real GDP growth of6.2 percent GDP3, 
with manufacturing forecast to expand at an £!-Verage rate of 9.4 percent per year, the 
agricultural sector by 3.5 percent per year, and the remainder of the economy by some 6 
percent per year. The achievement of these growth targets is projected to require a total 
investment of$ 300 billions. The private sector is expected to account for 70 percent of this 
investment. To mobilize the amount of private capital envisaged in Repelita VI, Indonesia 
must create and maintain an attractive economic environment for private investment; This 
will have to involve a continuing liberalization and deregulation of the economy, and in 
particular an easing of the remaining controls on investment and trade. The need for such 
measures has become especially critical in recent years following the emergence of a number 
of other Asian countries, such as China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, and India, as competitors for 
foreign investment flows. 
c. Capital Account and Debt 
Indonesia's current account deficit and debt amortization payments will be 
financed in the near-term by a combination of foreign direct and portfolio investment, 
3 Repelita VI came into effect on April, 1994. It represented the first five years phase of the 
25-year Second Long-Term Development Period. 
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offshore commercial borrowing, and multilateral and bilateral aid. Foreign direct 
investment, in particular, will benefit from the improved investment climate established via 
deregulation. This initiative has opened a number of sectors previously closed to foreign 
investors. Inflows of foreign capital will increase enough to maintain comfortable level of 
reserves. 
The appreciation of the Japanese yen versus the United States dollar has added 
to Indonesia's debt burden, already one of the highest in the developing world. The yen 
revaluation pushed the dollar value of Indonesia's debt over $ 100 billion. There is a 
currency mismatch between Indonesia's liabilities and its export receipts. About 40 percent 
of the external debt is dominated in yen, while about 90 percent of its export receipts are in 
United States dollars. About half of the external debt is public, and this public debt is at 
interest rates of about 3.5 percent. Only a quarter of the total foreign debt is short -term debt. 
Additional borrowing in 1996 will increase the external debt to $ 107 billion. 
Besides the country's heavy external debt and inflation, there are the persisting 
pressures of the current account deficit. This presently stands at $ 2 billion per annum or 
about 2 percent of GNP (Wignjowijoto 1995). The invisible account deficit is bigger, at 
$ 10 billion to $ 15 billion per annum, due partly to heavy repayment and servicing of the 
external debt, insurance payments, and the repatriation of profits. 
d. Growth and Stability 
There are risks attached to the dynamic expansion of the economy. Inflation 
reached 9.1 percent from year to year, a figure closer to the 10 percent level that would 
trigger official action. The government plans to use income from privatization to prepay 
debt, as it has already started to do with the proceeds from Indosat's flotation.4 Other state 
companies will follow in a programme of government disposal aimed at boosting and state 
sector's efficiency and off loading public debt. To maintain the 7 percent growth rate 
necessary to employ 2.5 million new people each year, the government has called for total 
of$ 330 billion over the next five years (Parsons 1995). 
4 Indo sat is a state-owned international telecommunication company. 
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The need to keep down the foreign debt has lead to the conclusion that 
three-quarters of the financing of the foreign debt must come from the private sector and be 
acquired from the capital markets. Accordingly, private consumption will increase from the 
larger base established as disposable incomes rise in response to higher wages, lower tariffs 
on consumer goods, and increased labor participation. Also contributing to the strength of 
consumption will be the continuing expansion of the middle class with its higher propensity 
to consume goods. 
e. Others 
Inefficiency is still troubling the economy despite efforts made to tackle it. The 
economy's efficiency rate is still low due to unnecessary costs imposed by almost any 
economic transaction. The growth of non-oil exports is now leveling off. Exports of textiles 
and plywood, which are currently the star performers, continue to decline in 1995. Despite 
a strong capability to generate production such as power, gas, water and telecommunications, 
the Indonesian economy makes poor uses of its existing infrastructure. 
In the services sector and in areas such as banking and finance, financial 
institutions are capable of mobilizing funds but seem unable to use them properly. The 
'insurance services market is also expanding, but insurance's ability to absorb risks is limited, 
as also evidenced by the huge reinsurance markets. This creates a heavy deficit in the 
invisible account. Another weakness in the economy is the distribution of goods and 
services from producers to consumers is slow; unemployment is refusing to go away and the 
gap is widening between the rich and the poor, between Java and outer islands, and between 
the western part and the eastern islands of the Indonesian archipelago. 
The major driving forces for the projected 7 percent growth of the economy will 
be industries involved in such mega projects as infrastructure, especially electricity, water, 
natural gas, telecommunications, highways, and major upstream industries, such as 
aluminum steel, olefin, and petrochemicals. These industries in the early stages of their 
development will definitely be protected. This is to ensure that downstream activities are not 
subject to foreign-induced supply instability and price volatility. The next industries that 
will drive the economy forward are those which support the urbanization process such as 
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public housing, middle and upper middle-class housing, shopping centers, business hotels, 
offices, apartments , and condominiums. 
D. PUBLIC SECTOR 
1. Background and Rational 
In the period 1949-1965 the Dutch colonial economy was dismantled and new 
socio-economic and political forces gathered themselves within Indonesia. The power of 
the state was reconstituted by political forces and used at various times to modify or confront 
the colonial economic structures and at the same time to protect and subsidize various 
elements of domestic capital, both state and private. Nevertheless, disengagement from the 
colonial economy was sought through a strategy of facilitating gradual domestic capital 
formation within existing structures. However, it had become clear that private domestic 
capital was unable to provide the basis for capital formation and the leader of the new 
republic began to turn towards state capital. 
By the mid-1950s, the new Indonesian republic was left with two options: a) Either 
retreat from its nationalist policies with respect to foreign capital and use foreign capital as 
the main generating force of a capitalist development or b) extending the process of 
economic nationalization and socialization by expropriating the remaining Dutch enterprises 
and using the state as the main engine generating industrialization. The indigenous 
bourgeoisie, including the party clients, supported the gathering momentum to move 
towards nationalization (Robison 1986, p. 62). By that time, the largest gain was made by 
the government sector and the expansion of indigenous capital was largely made up of state 
capital. 
In the Economic Declaration of 1963, the principles of Guided Economy that were 
followed were: first, the co-ordination and regulation by the state of all sectors of the 
Indonesian economy, (state, private, and cooperative), to ensure the integration of investment 
and production into the wider social and political goals and needs of Indonesia. State 
leadership would be provided both in the form of central planning and control over 
distribution, credit, and production and by direct state investment. Second, this also led to 
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the destruction of imperialism and the subordination of foreign capital to national social and 
economic goals. Finally, was the replacement of the colonial import/export economy with 
a more self-sufficient and industrialized economy. The expropriations were a major blow to 
foreign capital in Indonesia and fundamentally transformed the structure of the economy. 
The State-owned corporate become the largest and most crucial element of domestic 
capital in Indonesia. To a large degree, the establishment of a state corporate structure was 
an ad hoc response to the nationalization of Dutch enterprises. State corporations were 
formed to take over the confiscated enterprises because the absence of a strong indigenous 
domestic capitalist class. After the counter-revolution of 1965, several new factors brought 
about a change in the role of state corporation. Again, part of the reason for the continued 
dominance of state corporate capital also lay in the difficulty of selling off the corporations. 
Private indigenous capital simply did not have the resources. The importance of state 
corporations was enhanced in the 1970s when they were used by the state as the core of the 
new industrialization strategy. Only state corporations were sufficiently amenable to central 
planning or capable of operation at a loss if necessary in order to achieve the state objectives 
of major investment in the capital goods sectors, steel, petrochemicals, metal processing, 
pulp, and paper. 
2. Categories of Public Enterprises 
The state's intervention in the economy has not been confined to the imposition of 
regulatory controls, but has involved a considerable measure of direct participation in almost 
all fields of economic life. Government investment, both in the form of government fmanced 
development projects and in the form of equity participation in private sector project, forms 
a considerable proportion of total investment, giving the state sector a pre-eminent position 
in Indonesia's economic structure (Hobohn 1987, p.51 ). Virtually every sector of the 
economy has at its apex one or more large scale state owned corporations or PEs (Badan 
Usaha Milik Negara or BUMN). 
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a. In the Resources Sector 
PEs in this sector include Pertamina (oil), Timah (tin mining), Aneka Tambang 
(general mining) and Inhutani (forestry). Essentially they are the means through which the 
state establishes production and work-sharing agreements with the foreign companies which 
make the bulk of investments and carry out production. Included in their responsibilities are 
the collection of royalties and taxes, the allocation of concessions and contracts, and the 
supervision of domestic supplies. 
b. In the Provision of Infrastructure 
While the bulk of state investment in infrastructure goes through the development 
budget, there are also major state utilities such as Pekerjaan Umum (Public Works), P.T. 
Telkom (Telecommunications), and Perusahaan Listrik Negara (Electricity). 
c. In the Banking Sector 
As well as providing central banking facilities, state banks provide the bulk of 
commercial credit. The original purpose of the banking system was to act as an investment 
bank in buying and selling securities. Due to the lack of a developed capital market, this was 
not done. Instead, the banking system invested in many industrial enterprises which were 
regarded as its subsidiaries. These included house construction, cement plants, automobile 
assembly plants, etc. The Bank provides financial resources as well as manpower for the 
management of its subsidiaries. It was reorganized so that the emphasis has been placed 
more on industrial finance and industrial development. 
d. Types of Public Enterprises 
Further reorganization of PEs took place in 1967. The Presidential Instruction 
ordered that all PEs be converted into one of the following forms: 
• Departmental Agencies: Pemsahaan Jawatan (PERJAN). 
• Public Corporation: Pemsahaan Umum (PERUM). 
• State Companies: Pemsahaan Perseroan (PERSERO). 
Besides the above, there are four additional forms of PE: 
• State-owned Banks: Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI). 
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• Oil and natural gas m1mng: Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Negara 
(PERTAMINA) Regional PEs: Perusahaan Daerah (PERDA). 
• Military Enterprises. 
Thus, there are altogether seven types of PEs. The characteristics of the first three 
types of enterprises include the main objective of PERJAN being to serve the people rather 
than make profits, while PERUM, is orientated towards more profit-maximizing. Also, 
PERJAN is to be usually involved in the supply of public services such as state railways and 
PERUM is more likely to be engaged in production and distribution of goods and services. 
Secondly, PERSERO are run as a private company. Unlike PERJAN and PERUM which 
are wholly-owned by the government, PERSERO can be either wholly government owned 
or jointly owned by the government and private parties, including foreign investors. 
Enterprises under PERSERO are nationalized business and joint ventures which are mostly 
in electronics, textiles and plantations. 
3. Public Enterprises Performance 
Until recently almost half of the entire PEs performance showed the unhealthy 
financial condition of requiring large subsidies from the government. From the total of 178 
PEs which existed, 86 PEs or 48.3 percent were in "bad"(subsidized) and "very bad" 
condition (heavily subsidized).5 In 1995, 49 PEs or 27.5 percent in "very good" condition 
(profit generating), 43 PEs or 24.2 percent in "good" (condition would attract investment) 
, 37 PEs or 20.8 percent in "bad" condition, and 49 PEs or 27.5 percent in "very bad" 
condition. With their total asset reaching about $ 130.4 billions, Indonesia's PEs can be 
relied on as a backbone of national economy. PEs in bad and very bad condition will be 
difficult to optimize. Inefficiency of the PEs for long periods has depressed the economy 
because their operational area is nearly in every economic sector. The operation are in 
agriculture, manufacture, mine, trade, financial, telecommunication, electricity, construction 
etc. More important, some of them operate in strategic and base industries. 
5 According to Indonesian newspaper Kompas Online reported, April 18, 1996. 
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a. Public-private Investment Balance 
Indonesia's current gross domestic investment rate is estimated to be about 23 
percent of GDP. Investment has grown at an average rate of about 9 percent per annum 
between 1986-1992, faster than GDP growth (World Bank 1994, p.1 02). Provided that there 
is an adequate increase in the national savings rate, private investment should continue to 
grow rapidly and the overall investment rate in the economy should increase. The 
investment effort will need to be supported by increased efficiency of investment. Figure 
3 shows the projected (Post 1996) increase in the rates of private, public and total fixed 
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Figure 3. Total Private and Public Fixed Investment 
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The problem of raising the overall investment rate, improving the efficiency of 
investment, and raising national savings, lies in promoting private investment and savings. 
The government has few direct policy instruments to affect private sector decisions. But the 
principle lesson is that policies that consistently improve the incentives and climate for 
private investment in internationally competitive activities provide a powerful stimulus for 
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more and better investment. In turn, this leads to faster growth and increased savings. 
Private investment is expected to play the dominant role in the directly productive sectors 
of the economy. Most private investment is expected to go into these sectors. An increasing 
and significant role is also expected in infrastructure and other public service sectors. 
The government should progressively withdraw from directly productive sectors, 
by limiting fresh investment and undertaking a substantial program of divestiture. Cross 
country evidence indicates that public enterprise investment is consistently associated with 
lower aggregate growth and with lower rates of private investment (World Bank 1994, pp. 
103-104). Also, large public investment especially on projects that rely on foreign 
commercial borrowing, should continue to be screened carefully. This would ensure that 
only those projects that have high economic returns are financed. 
b. Public Enterprise Reform 
Based on a Presidential Decree in 1988, an assessment was made of the financial 
soundness of each PEs and a program developed for their restructuring. The proposed 
measures varied from a change oflegal status (e.g., from PERUM to PESERO), to mergers, 
to new management contracts, to joint ventures, to public share issues, and to liquidations. 
The Government also introduced a system to monitor enterprise financial performance 
annually, based on an evaluation of the firm's profitability, liquidity, and solvency. The PEs 
restructuring program introduced in 1989 was ambitious. The aim was to implement the 
program largely within two years. Its implementation, however, has not met those 
expectations. 
The plan had been for 52 public share issues by PEs and 16 joint-ventures, but 
only one has been realized in each case. Only one PE has been fully liquidated. Several 
other liquidation took the form of mergers. Most progress was made in the conversion of 
PEs into PERSERO legal status. During 1989-1991, six PEs were sold fully or in part to the 
private sector or to PEs employees. The introduction of corporate plans has been slow, their 
quality in many cases has lacked necessary analysis and strategic orientation, and their links 
to annual programs have remained weak. 
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c. Recent Performance 
In general, PEs have a decisive role in Indonesia economy. In 1994-1995 they 
contributed 12-16 percent to GDP, absorbed 1 million in employment, contributed 23.2 
percent of state income from their revenue, $ 1 billion income tax, and have total assets of 
about $130.4 billion.6 Inefficient PEs become more vulnerable in global competition where 
goods and services trading, including investment flow freely across national borders. In this 
era, every nation requires the capability to enter the competitive stage, which is tighter, 
fairer, and more transparent. However, the few studies that have been undertaken have 
concluded that their economic performance has been very poor. For example, State 
Electricity Company (PLN) found that it had low standards of teclmical efficiency and that 
its tariffs were among the highest in Asia. A study of the State Shipping Company (PELNI) 
revealed that in its 22 years of operation, it had failed to earn a profit (Hill1982, p.l016). 
Both these companies operate in a highly regulated, non-competitive environment. 
Inefficient PEs are caused by internal factors such as low management quality and 
external factors such as bureaucratic intervention. In management and organizational 
aspects, clear status and mission are essential. Although the PEs realize that in the economy 
they must strive to succeed and anticipate market demand, in reality it is difficult to create 
professional management systems to solve that problem. One of the reasons is the ambiguity 
of the proportional measurement of PEs mission: being an agent of development, an 
economy stabilizer, and a profit maximizer. Moreover, the status of the employee is crucial. 
They are government employees as well as a nongovernment employees; this status effects 
their motivation. 
Another constraint in the PEs organization model is hierarchies of many layers. 
This condition leads to communication and information flow deterioration. This situation 
creates bureaucrats work systems at all levels of management and managers prefer to 
maintain their position. Subsequently most of the employees feel no concern for the PEs 
main mission. Many PEs have no clear objective or strategic planning. Usually the creation 
6 According to Indonesian newspaper Republika Online reported, April 18, 1996. 
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of a system or a procedure in the company is common sense, so it would seem that which 
procedure existed only to fulfill administrative requirements and acquire legitimation and 
information. Traditional management characterized by an irrational and inflexible norm 
closes the opportunity to creative management and participation. 
According to Indonesian Business Data Center (Pusat Data Business Indonesia 
PDBI), from a sample of 59 PEs in 1993,25.4 percent PEs were very profitable, 17 percent 
profitable, 25.4 percent "sick", and 32.2 percent "very sick". Net profit in 1993 was about 
$ 1.9 billions, total asset about$ 113 billion, and turnover about$ 70.3 billion, The ratio 
between asset, turnover, and net profit is too small and is not proportional. Profit margins 
of only 2.74 percent and return on investment (ROI) of only 1.68 percent are too low by 
private sector standards. ROI can be one of the measurements of a PEs profitability. From 
this indicator, 23 PEs have ROI of more than 10 percent, 39 PEs ROI of 5 to 9.65 percent, 
73 PEs ROI of 1 to 4.91 percent, and 29 PEs ROI less than 1 percent, while 14 PEs are 
operated at a loss.7 
7 From Indonesian newspaper Kompas Online report, April 20, 1996. 
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IV. PRIVATIZATION IMPLEMENTATION 
Privatization redefines the role of the public sector. Privatization will change the 
business environment. Sales of PEs will have widespread implications for entrepreneurship, 
regulatory framework, financial institution, human resources, and foreign investment. 
Narrowly defined, privatization involves the transfer of ownership control or functions from 
the public to private sector. However, in the broad sense of the term, it includes any measure 
that reduces government involvement in economic activities. Thus, privatization is an 
integral part of the policy package that includes deregulation and economic liberalization. 
Dissatisfaction with the performance of PEs on the one hand, and the already 
strengthened private sector on the other, led the policy makers to take a fresh look at the role 
of government. After decades of high hopes for state intervention, the time had come to roll 
back the frontiers of state and to use the private sector as the engine of growth. Privatization 
is used not only in response to government failure but also as a posi~ive policy tool to assist 
in industrialization. Privatization does so by creating a competitive business environment 
that is conducive to productivity, foreign investment, and private entrepreneurship. 
A. PRIVATIZATIONINTENT 
While the key objective of private enterprises is profit maximization, PEs have to 
contend with multiple objectives that often conflict with this objective. These include 
general economic and noneconomic objectives, ranging from social obligation to political 
patronage. Often, PEs must be kept afloat at taxpayers' expense, either through explicit 
government subsidies, such as direct cash grants, or through implicit subsidies, such as 
subsidies credit, guaranteed sales to the government at fixed prices, reductions of tax 
liabilities, government equity injections, or preferential exchange rates. While there are 
different ways to improve the management of PEs, privatization is seen as the best means to 
enforce market discipline and promote an efficient allocation and use of resources. In 
addition, entire industries have to be restructured to ensure competitiveness and it will be 
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necessary to introduce regulation and supervision to produce effective competition. 
Increased competition can be brought to the market place through improvement in efficiency 
from the benefit of privatization. 
1. Public Enterprise Performance and Drive to Privatization 
The inadequate performance of PEs has created a heavy fiscal burden in terms of 
budget deficits and foreign borrowing. PEs, which are characterized by inefficiency and 
bureaucracy, are incapable of satisfying the demands of high population growth rates and 
urbanization. There are significant demands for public services and infrastructure. Indonesia 
needs to raise billions of dollars for physical infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications 
networks. Moreover, PEs, known for their bureaucratic structure and inefficient 
management, cannot be relied upon to adopt measures needed to increase their international 
competitiveness. 
Outward looking industrialization and a gn;>wing global interdependence have made . 
competitiveness a prerequisite for success. There is a growing need for foreign investment 
and expertise. Countries have realized that, to be competitive, they must focus on advanced 
technology and scientific research. Foreign capital and management are welcomed by the 
PEs that are scheduled for privatization. There is greater support for private sector-led 
growth, along with the ability and willingness of the private sector to provide public goods 
and services. Privatization is a policy response to the problems faced by the country. Export 
bias, the need for new technology, and a growing need- caused by the population growth-
for services play an important role in the privatization of the PEs. The common objectives 
of privatization are to: 
• Raise revenue for the government 
• Promote competition and efficiency by imposing the discipline of the market 
• Widen the capital market through popular capitalism 
• Attract foreign capital 
• Redistribute income and wealth (Doshi 1994, p.43) 
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2. Finance, Information, and Control 
There are essentially three factors that can justify privatization: finance, information, 
and control. The financing of both government and the firm is affected by privatization. The 
government raises finance in the process of disposing of assets; firms are free to finance in 
capital markets. Information is relevant in the process of setting prices. Competition ensures 
that prices are consistent with efficient allocation of resources and lowest cost of supply. 
Where price mechanisms alone are not adequate then control is of relevance. Changes in 
ownership are most directly associated with changes in control exerted by the state and a 
transfer of control to private investors. 
a. Financial 
An important motive is the anticipated alleviation of the PEs' budgetary burden 
on the government. The immediate effect will be a one time reduction in the government 
deficit, equal to the sales value of the assets. However, if the PEs are profitable, its 
privatization means that the government forfeits the future stream of income. The more 
important changes in the government's budgetary position will occur if privatization alters 
the operations of the enterprise. If privatization is expected to result in an improvement in 
the financial performance, it would be possible to sell loss-making enterprises, provided the 
anticipated gain in profitability is sufficiently large. In this situation the drain on the 
government's overall budget is reduced. An improvement in both financial and efficiency 
performance will occur if privatization is associated with competitive market conditions. 
b. Information 
Central to this was the notion that market encourages efficiency by providing 
incentives to managers and workers. Competition encourages efficiency by allowing 
consumers to purchase from lowest-cost suppliers. It achieves productive efficiency by 
encouraging firms to minimize costs and allocative efficiency by bringing consumers' 
demands in line with marginal cost supply. To the extent that privatization allows state-
owned monopolies to be broken up and competition to be introduced, privatization clearly 
offers considerable scope for efficiency improvements. Previously, PEs which were 
submerged in the depths of government ministries made accountability for performance 
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almost impossible to establish. After privatization, distinct enterprises have been created 
with clearly defined lines of responsibility. 
c. Control 
Control has been transferred from the public to the private sector. In most 
privatized firms, management has therefore been given a free rein. They improved 
incentives to perform efficiently; however there is little direct external control exerted by 
investors. While privatization has reduced the direct involvement of the government, this 
has in large part been transferred to the regulator. Privatization has conferred considerable 
powers on regulators to control the activities of privatized firms. The activities and powers 
of regulators are broadly defined. Most privatized companies have established regulatory 
departments, whose primary objective is to deter interference from the regulator and ensure 
that best possible outcomes can be negotiated with regulator. 
3. Criteria and Benefit 
a. Criteria 
It is helpful to structure the problem as a cost-benefit analysis. In principle, one 
might examine the effects of each alternative privatization proposal on different interest 
groups such as existing and potential customers, taxpayers, suppliers oflabor and capital, etc. 
Trade-offs between these interest groups could be established and decisions made 
accordingly. A single criterion might be used such as the present value of aggregate net 
benefits to consumers. This is measured primarily by lower prices of currently available 
goods and services. Effects on the level of output, the quality and variety of goods and 
services available, and the rate of innovation are also important. Changes in the distribution 
of benefits and effects on employees, suppliers, exports, and taxpayers must also be 
considered. Nevertheless, the criterion of aggregate net benefit to consumers seems a simple 
and appropriate starting point. The criterion of benefit to consumers should be used to design 
the privatization scheme as a whole. Consider some of the things to be decided in order to 
write prospectus for floating one or more successor companies. 
• The number of companies, the assets and liabilities of each, and their intended 
aims and scope of business; 
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• The structure of the industry in which the company will operate, especially the 
conditions of new entry; 
• The regulatory environment, including competition policy, efficiency audits, 
controls on prices or profits; 
• Non-commercial obligations and sources of funding for these obligations; 
• The timing of the privatization scheme, including the flotation date and the times 
at which new competition is allowed; 
• Future levels of the government share holding. (Bishop 1995, pp.16-17) 
b. Benefits 
Privatization is seen primarily as a means of improving the efficiency of the 
enterprises since it limits the scope for political interference in decision making and thus 
increases managerial incentives, and imposes the financial discipline of private capital 
markets. Through privatization, an enterprise can gain access to private sector financing, and 
a private owner may bring access to new markets. If the sale of PEs assets can be attractive 
to small investors, this will broaden share ownership (Nuskey 1992, p. 6). Also, it can spur 
the development of domestic capital market and lead to a reduction in public sector deficits, 
especially if the government can dispose of loss-making enterprises. In addition, it will 
increase competition and hence improve allocative efficiency. Privatization may also benefit 
enterprises that remain within the public sector. If a significant number of PEs can be 
transferred to the private sector, the government should be better placed to focus on the 
objectives, conduct, and performance of those enterprises remaining under its control. 
Subsequently, the criterion involves benefits for two sets of consumers: actual or 
potential consumers of the industry and other consumers, who benefit from savings in 
resources which may accompany privatization. If lower subsidies are paid, other consumers 
will benefit via lower taxation. Subsidies represent real resources which could be consumed 
elsewhere. Privatization will generate benefits for consumers because privately owned 
companies have a greater incentive to produce goods and services in the quantity and variety 
which consumers prefer. Companies which succeed in discovering and meeting consumer 
needs make profits and grow; the less successful will wither and die. 
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Resources tend to be used as consumers dictate, rather than according to the 
wishes of government. Moreover, consumers change the motivation of management toward 
profit-making; a privately owned company will have greater incentive to exploit monopoly 
power. A privatized company will be less willing to provide uneconomic services. The 
resources so released will be used more productively. The benefits of privatization derive 
partly from the ability to diversify and redeploy assets, unconstrained by nationalization 
statutes. 
4. Competition and Efficiency 
a. Competition 
Competition is the most important mechanism for maximizing consumer benefits, 
and for limiting monopoly power. Its essence is rivalry and freedom to enter a market. 
Different parts of the industry could compete if formed into horizontally separate companies. 
Resources or assets could be transferred to potential entrants. Vertically separating the 
industry into different companies would also generate rivalry at the interface. In the absence 
of competition, one cannot know in advance precisely what industry structure will prove 
most efficient. Therefore, as far as possible, the future growth of the industry should not be 
fixed by a rigid pattern such as before privatization. Companies should be allowed to expand 
or contract, diversify or specialize, as market forces dictate. 
The performance of any one firm depends on the actions of its rivals' 
managements as well as its own. If a management team performs poorly in competition to 
reduce costs, its market share, power and prestige are all likely to suffer as a consequence. 
The efficiency consequences of enterprise sales are therefore likely to be dependent upon the 
degree of competition. Where privatization is achieved by allowing firms to compete for the 
right to serve a market or supply a good that was previously served or supplied by a 
protected PEs, competition is immediately increased. Franchising and contracting out are 
attractive policy options precisely because they posses this property. Moreover, firms can 
be asked to place bids for the sole right of supply of the given commodity and, to prevent 
monopolistic pricing, the right can be awarded to the firm that offers to supply at the lowest 
price. Franchising therefore offers a possible solution to the natural monopoly problem. The 
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existence of a competitive bidding process will provide the authority with information about 
feasible costs of provision and create incentives for cost-efficient operation by public sector 
workers. (Yarrow 1986, p. 335) 
b. Efficiency 
A change to partial or complete private ownership can be expected to lessen the 
scope for political intervention in the operation of the enterprise. The enterprise's objectives 
will be simplified, overly complex networks of dysfunctional bureaucratic controls will be 
reduced, and the likelihood of arbitrary interference in operating decisions will be lessened. 
Each of this change can be expected to contribute to an improvement in productive 
efficiency. Internal reform of the PEs are an alternative option for realizing the same gains. 
The key factor determining the efficiency of an enterprise is how it is managed (Cook 19, 
p. 19). Altering the structures of property rights will improve the incentives for productive 
efficiency performance. This supposes that private firms need to perform efficiently to 
remain in business. The forces of competition should provide the incentive for enterprises 
to seek out opportunities to increase both productive and allocative efficiency. 
B. PRIVATIZATIONPROCESS 
Based on the International Financial Corporation's (IFC, an affiliate of the World 
Bank) experience of advising, the political and economic goals of privatization are traded off 
against one another in the privatization process. The tradeoff is shaped by the specifics of 
the business. It is far easier to insist on rules about employment retention when selling 
attractive assets where plenty of buyers are interested. The country's economic context is 
also important. High risk countries limit the access to external finance, while the state of 
domestic capital markets often limits the flexibility these governments have to achieve 
distributional goals. The privatization process8 which consists of an institutional framework 
8 Alan N. Miller's (Professor ofManagement in the College of Business and Economics 
at the University ofNevada, Las Vegas) research in United Kingdom result that there 
are 12 steps in the privatization process. The process has been used to privatize 
different size businesses from diverse industries. In infrastructure, there are 6 phases 
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and approach to the whole program, of how to structure each particular divestiture, the steps 
that need to be taken in preparation for sale, and how to manage the sale and negotiations are 
IFC's experiences. (Donaldson 1995, p.19) 
1. Institutional Framework and Approach 
Privatization is political at all stages, and at the earliest stage, the most political stage 
of all, the non-economic objectives and concerns are uppermost in people's minds. Signals 
are often conflicting from different parts of government involved in setting up privatization 
programs that hold different views. The legal and administrative authority for a decision is 
not clear. A key approach is that the process be as transparent as possible and as much as 
possible in the public domain. Specifically this implies the promotion of competition, the 
mounting of effective information and publicity campaigns, and in the case of smaller.:.scale 
work, a grass roots dialogue with the affected public in respond to public concerns. 
The launching of a privatization program depends on the extent of government strength 
and commitment. Strong governments have the widest set of options. When political 
strength exists alongside government commitment to reform, the route to privatization can 
be top-down, direct and swift. For a privatization program to gain momentum, early sales 
have to succeed. This suggests privatizing the easy candidates first. Adopting a sectoral 
approach to privatization can improve efficiency as well as the effectiveness of the 
privatization process. Depending on the industry and country concerned, the number of 
enterprises in the sector and the strategic linkages between them, governments can benefit 
from designing a privatization plan for the whole sector rather than simply following a case-
by -case approach. 
2. Structuring the Divestiture 
Once the institutional framework or broad approach is in place, a series of specific 
decisions is typically taken relating to how each individual privatization should be structured. 
In the more complex transactions, the vehicle for this is often a detailed strategic review 
requiring careful scrutiny, and experience and familiarity with a wide range of business and 
according to Scott Durchslag, Tino Puri, and Arvind Rao. 
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other issues. Tradeoffs are again involved, often at an extremely complex level of detail. 
Recommendations may be made concerning: the retention of strategic control by the state; 
the desirability of strategic restructuring; the allocation of shares to different groups of 
purchasers; the promotion of competition and the need for regulation; and what to do about 
social obligation. 
The business must define what sort of buyer should be courted. In a small-scale 
transaction, there is typically no time to consider business aspects or cost. In the larger and 
more specialized transactions, however, the business needs to drive the design of the 
transaction much more acutely. A political objective which often conflicts with business 
need is the desire to spread ownership. Strategic investors may be the only way for business 
to gain accesses to new management, technology, new markets, training, and investment 
finance. Privatizing by other means, particularly those involving wide share distribution, 
may not yield access to these inputs. The strategic review of the business needs of an 
enterprise also defines a whole set of issues relating to preparation for sale. 
Reconciling a buyer's need to be independent with government reluctance to let go is 
often a key element of the art of privatization. Many governments are reluctant to cede 
complete control to private investors, particularly foreign investors, in what is deemed to be 
strategic industries. Purchasers, on the other hand, want to run enterprises their own way and 
know very well that government is not an ordinary shareholder. Moreover, a pro-competitive 
structure is an essential part of privatization. There are many ways of achieving a competitive 
structure. Perfect competition is not always possible, and the best should not be the enemy 
of the good. Building job target into a sale is sometimes possible, though it can be costly. 
Governments often insist on a commitment to maintain employment, but other social goals 
are also occasionally included. For one major assignment, the extensive social obligations 
of the company together with significant over manning and indebtedness in an industry, 
leave privatization options limited. 
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3. Preparation for Sale 
In addition to the overall design of the structure of the privatization, advisers and their 
clients must address a wide variety of more specific issues when they sell enterprises. 
Included among these issues are, what to do with debt, whether to invest in the PEs prior to 
privatization, whether to define the scope of future investment, whether to value the 
enterprise prior to sale, how to manage the transition period, and what policy should be taken 
on environmental liabilities. Government should and usually does absorb PEs debt before 
sale. There is rarely any advantage in passing debt across to the private investor because for 
every dollar of debt, the bid price will be a dollar lower. Furthermore, bid payments are cash 
in hand now while debt repayments are generally in the future. 
Relating to investing before a sale, governments are often tempted to make enterprises 
more attractive to purchasers before the sale. This logic is often taken much further than 
mere cosmetic improvements. Substantial renovations and new investments are advocated, 
intended to transform the enterprise into a modern, well-performing entity. In shaping 
investment post-privatization, investors will often accommodate government desires for 
future investment. Most governments want sales to be followed by continued operations not 
closure and asset-stripping. Setting this as condition of sale is not often a problem provided 
the enterprise can be made viable. Just as investors are not happy to pay for investments 
made by government prior to privatization, they prefer flexibility on what to do with the 
company after it has been bought. 
In the area of management and organizational changes, while the main changes to a 
company's organization and management will occur after the sale, the period leading up to 
privatization is vital. Enterprises are living things, and deteriorate very quickly once they 
are "for sale." It is imperative, therefore, not only to complete divestiture as quickly as 
possible, but also to manage the business well in the interim. While a firm is for sale, key 
employees doubt the firm's commitment to them, are less motivated, are attracted to 
alternative employment, and may actually resort to sabotage or stealing if they feel 
sufficiently threatened. Customers similarly question the commitment of their supplier. 
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4. Negotiating the Sale 
There are two essential factors to balancing in this case. The first factor is the nature 
of the business in question, especially the size and complexity, the need for confidentiality, 
and the attractiveness to potential buyers. Another factor is the value commercial information 
may have for the bidders, who may be potential competitors. In opposition to the need for 
confidentiality, however, are government needs to also appear fair. Additionally, there is the 
damaging effect of hanging a public "for sale" sign on a business and this will generally have 
an effect on the business' performance and its value. 
Maximum transparency maximizes public support for privatization. The more 
competitive and open a sale can be, the more the public can observe and comment on how 
politicians have balanced their goals and the public can be reassured that the price is 
reasonable and the process has been fair. The open public auction is the ultimate in 
transparency. There are alternative processes such as the controlled auction, the small group 
negotiation, or the targeted negotiation with a single purchaser. Open auctions are well 
suited to non-complex situations in which there are many interested bidders, who are 
separated only by the price offered and where no one bidder uniquely fits the PEs. 
Controlled auctions are most appropriate where buyers must make substantial business 
investigations in order to understand the value of the business for sale, and the number of 
finalists is likely to limited. Controlled auctions may begin with the public request for 
bidders to submit their qualifications, including background and financial capability. Once 
these are established, the seller may also wish to hold a preliminary bidding round in which 
indicative financial proposals are made in order to identify serious bidders likely to be 
finalists. This process of bidder pre-qualification limits the damage which can be done to 
the seller's business from disclosure of proprietary information concerning its cost, margins, 
customers, and so on. 
The small group negotiation is similar to a controlled auction but has a much looser, 
undefined structure whose conclusion can be timed by the seller to coincide with a point of 
maximum negotiating leverage. The process is well suited to situations, where there are a 
small number of likely bidders and variety of potential transaction structure. Each potential 
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joint venture partner is offered a proposal incorporating different configurations of the 
existing business, each proposal value is considered separately. Negotiations are brought to 
conclusion in parallel to maximize bargaining leverage. Targeted negotiation with a single 
buyer can have the merit of avoiding a time-consuming and costly competitive process, 
especially where there is an obvious, eager buyer who will pay a premium to prevent an 
auction. This type of negotiation also maintains confidentiality. 
In closing the sale, selling governments should never underestimate the value of 
signing definitive agreements. The result of the auction procedure are never fully secured 
until the winning bidder's cash is in the seller's hands. Once the winner is declared it is 
difficult to return the runners-up to the bargaining table. So, the winner can position himself 
to renegotiate the detailed terms and conditions of sale. This can be fundamentally alter the 
deal, particularly if the seller's position is worsening in the meantime. As a general rule, 
agreements in principle should be avoided unless there is an overwhelming need for speed 
or the seller is in a very strong position to force the purchaser to conclude the transaction on 
the seller terms. 
C. EVALUATION AND SELECTION 
1. Priority 
The PEs should be privatized if the net benefits to consumers from doing so are 
positive. Which PEs should then be given priority? The criterion indicates those PEs where 
the consumer benefits of privatization are greatest. There are several approaches to 
determine the greatest benefit. One of them is a larger PEs offers larger potential scope for 
savings. That is, if costs and prices can be reduced by an average of x percent, PEs with a 
turnover of $ 2 million offers twice the potential benefit of PEs with a turnover of $ 1 
million. It can be assumed that the PEs with larger assets can offer larger consumer benefits. 
In other words; priority should be given to privatize those PEs where consumer benefits are 
likely to be greatest. Potential benefits will depend upon the size (assets) of the PEs. 
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2. Infrastructure Demand 
Another consideration is infrastructure demand. Many developing economies, 
including Indonesia, face a similar conundrum: rapidly growing demand for roads, power, 
and telecommunications. Closing this infrastructure gap by implementing a properly-
structured infrastructure privatization program, can be a critical catalyst for economic 
development while also providing highly attractive investment opportunities for both foreign 
and domestic companies (Durchslag 1994, p. 3). Moreover, infrastructure privatization can 
have an even greater economic impact, since infrastructure determines the availability of 
essential industrial inputs like power, as well as providing the means to reach both domestic 
and global markets via roads, ports, airports, and telecommunication networks. 
3. BUMN Under Ministries 
From 49 PEs in "good" condition or 27.5 percent of total Indonesian PEs in 1995, 
Indonesian economy bulletin Warta Ekonomi l~sted 39 PEs under ministry department. 
Table 1 shows their assets, sales, revenues, and assets turnover. 
The PEs in Department of Public Work, Communication and Transportation are related 
to infrastructure, concern about roads, ports, airports, and telecommunication network 
development. Based on total assets, the three largest assets are also the PEs in Department 
of Communication, Transportation, and Public Work, follows by PEs in Department of Mine 
and Energy, Department of Employment, and Department of Financial. 
4. Privatization Priority Order of PEs 
The highest priority PEs to privatize is based on the criterion of which PEs offer larger 
potential scope for savings and concern with infrastructure development. PEs that 
encompass this criterion and become the highest priority are as follows: first, PEs in the 
Department of Communication with total assets of Rp. 9,467.52 billion9 and an assets 
turnover of 19 percent. Second, PEs in the Department of Transportation with total assets 
of Rp. 7,923.05 billion and assets turnover of 4 percent. Third, PEs in the Department of 
Public Work with total assets ofRp. 1,765.75 billion and assets turnover of 15 percent. The 
9 In billion ofRupiah (Indonesian currency); May 1996: 1 US$= 2,340 Rupiah (Rp.) 
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second priority in order are PEs in the Department of Mine and Energy with total assets of 
Rp. 2,580.62 billion and an assets turnover of 12 percent, PEs in Department of Financial 
with total assets of Rp 1,057.69 billion and an assets turnover of 22 percent, and PEs in 
Department of Agriculture with total assets of Rp. 1,003:47 and an assets turnover of 17 
percent. The remaining are in a low category of priority. 
Department Number Total Sales 
of PEs Assets 
Financial 3 1,057.69 507.12 
Agriculture 3 1,003.47 686.46 
Industry 3 107 59.33 
Defense 1 357.37 83.25 
Forestry 3 702.34 634.68 
Information 2 99.6I I5.8I 
Mine & Energy 2 2,103.39 676.4 
Public Work 3 1,765.75 478.59 
Communication 3 9,467.52 4,6I5.31 
Health 3 837.68 770.53 
Employment I 2,750.47 978.36 
Trade 3 359.I7 4I0.6 
Education I 42.5 I9.58 
State Secretary I 65.6 139.31 
Strategic Industry 3 538.44 353.21 
Transportation 3 7,923.05 4,067.4 
In billion of Rupiah (Indonesian currency); May 1996: I US$= 2,340 Rupiah (Rp.) 




















Table 1. Thirty-nine PEs Under Ministry Department 
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D. MANAGEMENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATIZATION 
Privatization is not merely a policy measure to revitalize the economy. More 
fundamentally it represents a refinement or change in government philosophy of the political 
economy. Privatization is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon comprising diverse options 
and methods of ownership transfer. Care must be exercised to avoid substituting private 
monopolies for public monopolies. Although productive efficiency may be prime motive 
or objective for privatization, market competition also involves considerations of equity and 
continuing government control. Economic decline or fluctuations, as well as political 
uncertainties, may constrain, interdict, or delay privatization efforts. 
While privatization can be carried out in a very short period of time for some PEs, 
others may require more time to create the appropriate conditions necessary for success. 
Privatization should not be viewed as a goal in itself and must be thought of within a more 
general framework of deregulation and liberalization of the economy. Procedurally, 
privatization should start out by defining goals, which include the purely technical and 
economic aspects, as well as the policy-oriented issues relating to property concentration and 
type of investor. Once goals are set, an analysis of the type of enterprise and its market 
structure should be undertaken. 
1. Managing the Economic Policy Environment 
The most important management policy is that of establishing an appropriate set of 
economic policies for privatization and private enterprise development and managing the 
economic reforms necessary to support an expansion private sector. Neither domestic nor 
foreign investors will participate heavily in privatization in countries where economic and 
political risk are high (Rondinelli 1994, p. 21 ). The privatization process must create an 
economic policy environment conducive to the growth of a sound market economy. 
The element of economic reform that are necessary to support privatization and private 
enterprise development include structural adjustment policies to create market mechanisms, 
financial liberalization and the reduction of price controls. Economic stabilization policies 
including debt rescheduling, control of the money supply, and reduction of subsidies. This 
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is related to trade and investment reform, including programs for export promotion, foreign 
direct investment, exchange rate adjustments, and reduction of investment restrictions and 
trade barriers. Deregulation in industry and services must allow private enterprise to operate 
efficiently and effectively without government intervention. Also, government policy 
changes give an opportunity to multinational corporation to deliver incentive and support for 
the development of small and medium-sized enterprise. 
2. Managing the Privatization Process 
Managing the privatization process is complicated. A set of important management 
principles that clearly identify the objectives of privatization, create an effective privatization 
agency, select appropriate methods of privatization, and develop clear and transparent 
procedures are required. Objectives may include increasing efficiency, reducing debt, 
promoting competition, raising revenues, and budgetary relief. The most effective means 
to manage the privatization process is to centrali;Ze responsibilities for policy making in a 
single ministry or agent. At the same time, responsibilities for implementation should be 
decentralized. 
Various means are available to privatize PEs. Each method has different 
characteristics, requirements, advantages, and weaknesses. No single method is the most 
appropriate for divesting all PEs or eliciting the participation of the private sector in all 
functions. Governments must choose the methods that are most appropriate for achieving 
their objective. Transparency must exist in every privatization transaction. Transparency 
can be achieved by utilizing clear and simple selection criteria for evaluating bids, clearly 
defined competitive bidding procedures, and adequate monitoring and supervision of the 
program. Finally, governments should allow for restructuring, liquidation, or bankruptcy of 
PEs that cannot be sold. 
E. PRIVATIZATION IN INDONESIA 
Despite making tremendous headway toward creating a market-oriented society, 55 
percent oflndonesia's economy is still under state control. The government is committed to 
ensuring that the state enterprises become profitable under deregulation and a more 
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liberalized economy. But large companies, such as the national airline, Garuda, must find 
solutions for major operating inefficiencies before they will be consistently profitable 
enough or fit for public sale. 
A major handicap for the government in its drive to speed the privatization process is 
the underdeveloped condition of local financial institutions such as banks, securities 
companies, and mutual funds. This means that the majority of funding must be supplied by 
foreigners, who currently account for 70 percent of daily trading on the Jakarta Stock 
Exchange. Recognizing that an ever growing number of enterprises put up for privatization 
greatly increases the selectivity of investors, the Indonesian government is taking steps to 
merge state companies into large enough entities to command overseas interest in 
investment. 
The mergers ofGresik, Semen Tonasa and Semen Padang now underway will create 
the largest cement company in the country, topping Indocement. This new company will 
serve the less developed areas of eastern Indonesia. Similar moves have been made in 
shipbuilding and the results may be seen in ports and in the construction sector of Indonesia 
in the future. Overall, there is cause for optimism. The government was very successful in 
the privatization of its telecommunications giant Indosat. Indosat was floated in December 
1994 on the New York Stock Exchange. 
Not so long ago, privatization was a dirty word in Indonesia. Indonesia has suffered 
during the colonial experience under the Dutch. The idea of selling state companies to 
foreigners and non-indigenous locals was anathema. As times changed, Wall Street 
investment bankers have flocked to Jakarta hoping to pick up commissions for steering the 
biggest and best public sector firms onto the international markets. Bureaucrats, local 
brokers, and companies have seen the benefits of financial globalization. 
Small investors have started buying shares in state-owned companies, this in a country 
where only six years ago the stock market barely functioned. The market itself has rocketed, 
achieving a capitalization of US$ 7 5 billion and fielding a roster of 232 companies at the 
end of 1995. This is compared to 53 companies with a capitalization ofUS$ 9.6 billion at the 
end of 1989. The privatization program will change the face of business in Indonesia. 
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Of the top 10 listed companies on the Jakarta Stock Exchange, four are owned by 
Indonesians, with a total market capitalization of nearly US$ 20 billion. By far the largest 
is Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Telkom), privatized last year with a market capitalization of 
US$ 12.4 billion. There is more in the future. Scheduled for listing this year or soon after are 
Jasa Marga, a toll-road builder and operator; Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PLN), the giant 
electricity utility; Krakatau Steel; and a profitable state bank, BNI. 
Waiting in the wings are airlines, railway companies, plantation firms, chemicals and 
fertilizer companies, aerospace and shipbuilding firms, banks and finance houses, media 
firms, more public utilities and the biggest prize of all Pertamina, the state oil company, one 
of the largest firms in Southeast Asia. For the Indonesian government, the idea that investors 
in New York and London would line up to buy shares in an Indonesian telephone company 
was unimaginable at the start of this decade. But investors, both international and domestic, 
have queued to buy shares in the two telephone companies- Indosat and Telkom- putting 
a total of almost US$ 3 billion into the hands of both the government and the companies. 
Apart from putting funds into government coffers to support debt repayment, the drive 
to privatize has had another major effect: it has giving an extra impetus to a push to make the 
state sector more transparent. Transparency is desperately needed. For years, state-owned 
companies, whose accounts are not usually published, have been subject to "unofficial costs" 
and pressure from powerful political insiders, forcing them to take actions or do deals that 
were disastrous to their operations. 
The Director-General in charge of state companies at the Ministry of Finance is likely 
to push for further development of the Jakarta Stock Exchange through more privatization 
of state companies. The Director-General is expected to press for foreign investment banks 
to set up offices in Indonesia before awarding privatization commissions. Indonesia's strategy 
of pursuing privatization through international markets has been successful. The benefits of 
privatization and globalization for Indonesia are thus extending well beyond simply putting 
much-needed cash into the government's pockets. For a country with a long history of state 
control, combined with a popular tendency to mistrust foreigners, the change has been 
revolutionary, and many of the benefits are still to come. 
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The Indonesian privatization is an expansive program with a specific commitment to 
coordinate privatization strategies to maximize overall efficiency, and to utilize external 
sources of finance, managerial skills, new forms of technology, and marketing expertise as 
a means to promote industrialization and growth. The targets are indicative of a long-term 
commitment to industrialization and diversification using privatization as the catalytic policy 
instrument for industrial development. 
There are a number of distinguishing characteristics from the international privatization 
experiences, the range of privatization techniques used, the strong symbiotic role of capital 
market development, and the utilization of the privatization process to promote economic 
equality amongst social/ethnic groups. Perhaps, the most useful innovation for Indonesia is 
the creation of an institution tasked with the job of restructuring and privatizing. An 
inter-departmental committee under the chairmanship of the Economic Planning Unit within 
the Office of the Prime Minister is responsible for and authorized with planning, 
coordinating, implementing, evaluating, and monitoring the privatization program. The 
Director-General office that is in charge of state companies within the Office of Indonesian 
Ministry of Finance is one of the candidates for the establishment of this institution which 
will control all privatization process. 
Indonesia privatization policy should be characterized by four central themes. First, 
it is politically driven and guided by measures intended to promote popular participation. 
Second, the program is highly structured and has developed an extensive institutional 
capacity to plan and implement transactions. Third, privatization and the role that foreign 
participation must play a part in the process and be championed aggressively by the 
government. This top level commitment can create a policy design and implementation 
atmosphere where innovative approaches involving the private sector can be undertaken. 
Fourth, the program should focus on utilizing privatization to develop for Indonesia an 
internationally competitive infrastructure, such as telecommunications, power, highways, and 




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To fulfill human requirements for many different kinds of goods and services takes a 
particular relationship between producer, consumer, and arranger. A producer can be a unit 
of government, a voluntary association, a private firm, a nonprofit agency, or consumer 
himself. The concept of every economic organization is specialization and cooperative 
production to increase productivity, maintain competitiveness and realize a profit, be it 
material or social. A perfectly competitive static economy generally assumes that all buyers 
and sellers know all the relevant prices in the system in order that equilibrium be attained. 
But, there still remains the problem of the determination of the "correct" prices if the market 
is not initially at an equilibrium. In the absence of universal omniscience, buyers and sellers 
must be allowed to explore the market for this correct price. 
PEs are enterprises that are publicly owned and must produce private goods, and sell 
these goods at a price related to cost. In developing economies, PEs have had the role of 
galvanizing domestic manufacturing activity, providing infra-structural services, or winning 
and channeling foreign economic assistance. In contrast, lack of market competition, 
multiplicity of objectives, inadequate monitoring, and non-profit objectives are all less likely 
to promote cost-saving innovations and cost minimization. Those factors are the 
predominant sources of PEs inefficiency and subsequent budget deficits. 
Sustained robust growth is central to achieving Indonesia's development objectives. 
In maintaining a stable macroeconomic environment, the main challenge stems from 
Indonesia's large external debt. The debt burden is heavy and it limits Indonesia's policy 
flexibility and raises its vulnerability to external shocks. Policies for growth will need to 
adapt to the evolving nature of the growth process. Success in sustaining the momentum of 
growth will depend greatly on how effectively Indonesia manages some important 
dimensions of this evolution. In an increasingly competitive international business climate, 
raising efficiency and productivity must be the key to sustain the dynamism of economic 
development. 
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Efficiency and productivity improvements hold the key the future growth. The critical 
need is to foster increased competition by opening the economy further to foreign 
competition, but also by intensifying efforts to remove barriers to competition within the 
domestic economy. More broadly, raising efficiency and productivity will be essential to 
realizing Indonesia's growth objectives within the limits of available resources. Inadequate 
' performance of PEs have created a heavy fiscal burden in terms of budget deficits and 
foreign borrowing. PEs, which are characterized by inefficiency and bureaucracy, are 
incapable of satisfying the demands of high population growth rates and urbanization. In 
addition, there is a significant demand for public services and infrastructure. In fact, PEs 
known for their bureaucratic structure and inefficient management, cannot be relied on to 
adopt measures needed to increase international competitiveness. 
Privatization redefines the role of the public sector. It will change the business 
environment. Sales of PEs will have widespread implications for entrepreneurship, 
regulatory framework, financial institution, human resources, and foreign investment. Also, 
privatization involves not only the transfer of ownership control or functions from the public 
to private sector, but also includes deregulation and economic liberalization. Moreover, 
privatization is used not only as a response to government failure but also as a positive policy 
tool to assist industrialization by creating a competitive business environment that is 
conducive to productivity, foreign investment, and private entrepreneurship. Increase 
revenues for the government, promotion of competition and efficiency, widen up the capital 
market through popular capitalism, attracting foreign capital, and redistributing income and 
wealth can be offered by privatization. 
Various means are available to privatize PEs. Each method has different 
characteristics, requirements, advantages, and weakness. No single method is the most 
appropriate for divesting all PEs or eliciting the participation of the private sector in all 
functions. Governments must choose the methods that are most appropriate for achieving 
their objective. Most importantly transparency must be present in every privatization 
transaction. Establishing an appropriate set of economic policies for privatization and 
private enterprise development, and managing the economic reforms is necessary to support 
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an expanded private sector. Neither domestic nor foreign investors will participate heavily 
in privatization in countries where economic and political risk are high. Finally, 
privatization process must create an economic policy environment conducive to the growth 
of a sound market economy. 
A. CONCLUSION 
In Indonesia, a country that has suffered under the Dutch colonialism, the idea of 
selling state companies to foreigners or non-indigenous locals was taboo. But, as the biggest 
and best public sector firms go onto the international markets, bureaucrats, local brokers, and 
companies have seen the benefits of financial globalization. Also, the future is bright with 
more companies to be privatized. Beyond this wave of privatization, transparency is 
obviously required for the PEs. Additionally, an expansive program, economic pragmatism, 
policy themes, and highly structural institutions are needed. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Privatization in Indonesia can improve economic growth. With respect to the 
management ofthe privatization of Indonesian PEs and economic liberalization, and based 
on this research the author recommends the following: 
• The process of privatization and liberalization should be motivated more by 
economic pragmatism than ideological consideration. 
• Should create one institution which controls all privatization programs. 
• Transparency is desperately needed. Privatization in Indonesia should be 
prompted by expandable programs with a specific commitment to coordinate 
privatization strategies and to maximize efficiency. 
• Privatization policy should be characterized by four central themes: promote 
popular participation, create highly structural and extensive institutional capacity, 
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